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ABSTRACT 
This study consists of three individual essays which all shed light on assessing the 
price rigidity by using price micro data in the UK. The relevant implications for 
macro models are also discussed in each essay respectively.  
The first essay gives a unified framework a la Dixon (2012) to gauge the price 
rigidity from three perspectives: frequency, hazard function and distribution across 
firms. On average, the monthly frequency of consumer price change is 19% between 
1996 and 2007. Sales and substitutions will significantly affect the frequency of 
consumer price change. The frequency of consumer price change varies considerable 
across sectors. The fraction of price changes which are decreasing is about 40%. The 
hazard function is downward sloping with 12-month spike. The censoring and 
sampling issues in the estimation of hazard function are discussed thoroughly. The 
distribution across firms is derived from estimated hazard function, which is 
consistent with the frequency of price changes. Two benchmark sticky price models 
are calibrated and simulated. Furthermore, a multiple Calvo and multiple menu costs 
model are also simulated, based on the empirical finding in micro data. The 
simulation results suggest that introducing heterogeneity into sticky price models can 
improve models' fitness in respect to matching micro evidence. 
The second essay mainly focus on "the monthly frequency of price changes", which is 
a prominent feature of many studies of the CPI micro-data. In this essay, we see how 
much the frequency ties down the behavior of price-setters ("firms") in steady-state in 
terms of the average length of price-spells across firms. We are able to divide an 
upper and lower bound for the mean duration of price-spells averaged across firms. 
We use the UK CPI data at the aggregate and sectoral level and find that the actual 
mean is about twice the theoretical minimum consistent with the observed frequency. 
We estimate the distribution using the hazard function and find that although the 
estimated hazard differs significantly from the Calvo distribution, the means and 
medians are similar. However, despite the micro differences, we find that the artificial 
Calvo distributions generated using the sectoral frequencies result in very similar 
impulse responses to the estimated hazards when used in the Smets-Wouters (2003) 
model. 
The third essay examines the behavior of individual producer prices in the UK. A 
number of stylized facts about price setting behavior are uncovered. A time-varying 
Ss model is set up in a way that is consistent with the stylized facts obtained from the 
UK PPI data. A duration model (semiparametric survival analysis model) is built in 
line with the time-varying Ss model. This duration model is estimated by controlling 
for observed and unobserved heterogeneity across firms. The estimation results 
suggest that the increase in the inflation rate will significantly increase the hazard rate 
of price change. The other factors considered in the model will also affect the hazard 
rate of price change, while in different magnitude. 
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Chapter 1
General Introduction
In this thesis, I intend to analyze nominal price rigidities under a unied framework
proposed by Dixon (2012), employing micro price data underlying CPI and PPI in the
United Kingdom. I also attempt to reconcile micro and macro evidence, adopting a
common general framework that allows for an explicit modeling of the distribution of
contract lengths and for di¤erent types of price setting. I also evaluate how far the
theories are consistent with the micro evidence on price rigidity. I investigate the rms
decision to change its price by developing a time-varying Ss band model, which allows
evaluation of di¤erences across rms and economic sectors in the hazard rate of price
changes. In this chapter, I will provide a brief overview of the area of study explored in
this thesis. The motivation behind the study will be outlined and introductions to the
areas of research, the research questions and an insight into the structure of the thesis
will be explored.
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1.1 Research Background and Current Situation
The study of nominal price rigidities is "one of the hot topics of research in macro today".
Blanchard (2009) highlighted the role of nominal rigidities in his paper of "The State of
Macro":
The new-Keynesians...accepted the need for better foundations for the various
imperfections underlying that approach. The research program became one of
examining, theoretically and empirically, the nature and the reality of various
imperfections, from nominal rigidities, to e¢ ciency wages, to credit market
constraints.
There is a considerable amount of theoretical and empirical literature on nominal
price rigidities.
1.1.1 Models of pricing
There are several theoretical approaches in the literature modelling nominal rigidities at
the individual level. They are based on various assumptions for price non-adjustment:
Calvo/Taylor type contract; menu costs, sticky information; customer anger. I will review
the assumptions and implication of these pricing models, so as to check them against
micro evidence and macro evidence.
Taylor/Calvo type model Nominal prices, according to Taylor (1980), are xed by
assumption for a certain number periods. If price changes were perfectly staggered over
11
time, duration of nominal prices remains constant for all .rms. In the Taylor model,
prices are xed for N periods and the hazard rate is zero for all duration except N; when
the period is N, the hazard rate is one. Hence, the hazard rate is the measurement of
likelihood of a price change depending on the elapsed duration of a price spell.
In the Calvo (1983) model, the probability of a price change is constant. Each period,
a xed proportion of rms are able to change prices; the remaining rms keep their
nominal prices xed. The probability of being able to change price is the same for all
rms, regardless of when they changed price last. This means that the hazard rate is
constant.
The simple Taylor and Calvo type price setting models are inadequate in generating
enough persistence of output and ination to monetary policy shocks (e.g., Fuhrer and
Moore, 1995, Chari et al., 2000, Christian et al., 2005).
One popular theoretical justication is to add indexation to the Calvo model (e.g.,
Smets and Wouters 2003, Woodford 2003, Christiano et al. 2005). Price is set at the
beginning of the contract, and for the contract duration this is updated by the previous
periods ination. Though the Calvo with indexation can model ination and output
persistence well, it is at the cost of having prices changing every period.
Generalized Taylor (GT)1 model and Generalized Calvo model2 are introduced to
explain ination and output persistence while being consistent with the microevidence
on nominal rigidity. In GT model, there are many sectors with di¤erent price-spell
1See Taylor (1993), Coenen et al (2007), and Dixon and Kara (2010,2011), Dixon (2012) for details.
2See Wolman (1999), Mash (2003), Sheedy (2007), Dixon (2012).
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lengths, and within each sector there is a simple Taylor process. In GC model, the reset
probability is duration-dependent. Additionally, we can model the price setting strategy
as a multiple sector Calvo model (MC), which is special case of GC3. A key feature of these
generalized models is that they reect the substantial heterogeneity observed in micro
data. Price rigidity varies across sectors. In the presence of pricing complementarities the
slow adjusting sectors have a disproportionally large e¤ect on overall price adjustment,
slowing the price response, and increasing the output response to shocks. The intuition is
as follows. When a heterogeneous economy is hit by a shock, the initial adjustment takes
place by rms mostly in the fast adjusting sectors. As time passes, a large proportion of
rms that still have to adjust are rms in the slow-adjusting sector. In other words, the
adjustment process is dominated initially by high frequency adjusters and later by low
frequency adjusters. Furthermore, the presence of slow adjusting sectors and strategic
complementarities slows down price adjustment in the fast adjusting sectors.
As supposed by Dixon (2012), we can link the GT with micro data by looking at the
cross-sectional distribution of duration across rms, and link the GC to the micro data
through the hazard function. Moreover, MC can be linked to micro data by looking at
the frequency of price changes at sectoral level.
3See Carvalho (2006), and Dixon (2012).
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Menu costs
The menu costs model assumes that the price change is costly and these costs prevent
rms from changing prices in a continuous manner. Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) show
that in presence of price changing costs, the optimal pricing policy is of the (S,s) type.
The S and s indicate the upper and lower bound for the real price, respectively. Once
the real price lies within the bounds, the nominal price will be kept constant. Over the
pricing period, the optimal policy is a kind of state-contingent policy.
Under state-contingent policy, rms adjust prices within a relative large range due
to the fact that the current prices had been deviated from the optimal price. That the
aggregate price level will be adjusted more rapidly to nominal changes is resulted from
the selection e¤ect, in particular, when rms are constrained by state-contingent instead
of time-contingent pricing. Monetary shocks have been evidenced to have longer lasting
real output e¤ect in time-dependent (i.e. Calvo) models than in menu costs model4. In
addition, monetary impulses make prices elicit more rapid response in menu costs models
than in time-dependent models.
The menu costs models are usually solved using numerical methods, so no analyti-
cal expression is available for the hazard rate. In most calibrations made by previous
researchers, the hazard is increasing with the duration.
4See Caplin and Spulber (1987), Dotsey et al. (1999), Gertler and Leahy (2006), and Golosov and
Lucas (2007).
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Sticky information
It is assumed that it is costly for rms to gather information about the current economic
conditions (Mankiw and Reis, 2002). Fischer (1977) pointed out those opportunities to
adopt new price paths had been evidenced to arise stochastically. New information about
the state of the economy has been adopted and a new path of optimal prices has been
updated each period. Outdated information is used to make pricing decisions by the rest
of rms. Ination, therefore, depends on previous expectations of current ination and
output.
Because substantially larger and persistent real e¤ects are resulted from monetary
shocks, the sticky information model t macroeconomic facts better. However, in absence
of other frictions, some form of indexation no matter it is to the general, sectoral or price
level is involved in rmsoptimal price plans in absence of other frictions. Therefore, all
rms change price all the time in sticky information model. This argument, however, is
contradictory to empirical evidence based on micro economic data. Prior studies make
attempts to solve this problem by combining sticky information with menu costs (Klenow
and Willis, 2006; Knotek, 2006). Using both assumptions, namely, sticky information
and menu costs, causes two consequences: prices are not constantly changed; and old
aggregate level ination innovations will be reected by the new prices when both as-
sumptions change. This is due to the fact that price changes are not in accordance with
getting informed about the state of the economy. Knoteck (2006) suggested that the
micro features of the economy can be inferred by adjusting parameters to match general
15
macroeconomic behaviour. He found that information is updated once every 7 quarters
typically; price is changed once every 2 quarters; and 10% of prices remain unchanged
for more than 2 years. An economy in which rm face both menu costs and a cost of
knowing macroeconomic conditions needs to be considered (Gorodnichenko, 2008). Two
methods that rms can adopt to get information either paying the costs or by learning
the actions of other .rms. This results in an information externality and encourages rms
delay their price adjustment. Following a shock, price adjustment is postponed because
rms expect to catch the chance to observe other rms actions in order to achieve better
pricing choice. As a result, ination responds to nominal shocks slowly and the response
is hump-shaped, and ination is persistent.
Customer anger
Rotemberg (2005) develops a model to explain the price rigidity. This model indicates
that consumers analyse rmspricing decision depending on the perception of fairness.
If consumers are convinced that price are unfair, they will have adverse reaction towards
relevant products or services. Hence, rms may reluctant to change prices to avoid
potential anger. Chances are that rms keep prices the same even if they desire to change
prices due to the fact that price changing will elicit consumersevaluation of fairness of
prices and cause potential negative reactions. Overall, rms respond to macroeconomics
conditions and change prices. For example, consumers are unlikely to have negative
reaction and accept prices change under the circumstances of rapid ination. In addition,
16
customers who are heterogeneous in information holding will have various responses to
price changing. Firms will change the prices within di¤erent time schedule pertinent to
the development of consumers beliefs.
1.1.2 Empirical studies
Micro price studies have been conducted using di¤erent sources of data, such as the micro
data underlying national CPIs and PPIs, sub-national store scanner data, "scraping"
prices from internet, and the survey data. A set of stylized facts have been found in
empirical analyses. They are summarized as following5:
Prices change infrequently
Dhyne et al. (2006) nd that the monthly frequency of consumer price change is about
15% in the euro area. Excluding the countries with the highest and the lowest frequency,
the resulting frequency of price changes is 16.9%. The implied average duration, which
equals to the inverse of frequency, is about a year. Vermeulen et al. (2006) show that
the average frequency of producer price change is 21% in the euro area. Bils and Klenow
(2004) report that the average frequency of consumer price change in the US for 1995-
1997 period is 26.1%; While Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) nd that the monthly frequency
of the US consumer price change is 29.3% between 1998 and 2003.
Sales are common in the US consumer price data, the share of sales prices in the US
5This study mainly reviews the empirical nding from using CPI and PPI micro data in the US and
the euro area, respectively. For a good broaden review, see Klenow and Malin (2009).
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CPI data is about 20%. Specically, Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) dene sale as a
situation in which a price falls temporarily and then returns to the price in e¤ect just
before the decrease, and in such situation no regular price change is recorded. There are
some other methods to identify sales. For example, Kehoe and Midrigan (2007) indicates
a sale if "price decrease is followed by any price increase thereafter". Nakamura and
Steinsson (2008) nd that after excluding the sale prices, the median frequency of the
US consumer prices is 11.1% in 1988-1997, and 8.7% in 1998-2005.
Substitutions are observed in many sectors. Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) report
that the monthly rate of forced item substitution is about 10 percent in "Apparel" and
"Transportation Goods", and about 6 percent in "Recreation Groups". Klenow and
Willis (2007) estimate that price changes associated with item substitutions are sensitive
to ination. However, the ndings of Klenow and Willis (2007) depend to some degree
on their modeling assumptions.
The frequency of price changes varies across sectors
Dhyne et al. (2006) document the heterogeneity with respect to frequency of consumer
price changes across sectors in the euro area. The frequency of price changes ranges
from 5.6% in "Services" to 28.3% in "Unprocessed Food" and 78% in "Oil Products".
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) report the distribution of the frequency of price changes
for about 300 Entry Level Items (ELI). The ELI with the highest frequency of price
changes, 100%, is "Used Cars". The ELI with the lowest frequency of price changes,
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1.6%, is "Legal Services".
The micro data show that, in the real world, there are many heterogeneous rms. In
general, a macro model with a "representative rm" does not behave like a model with
many heterogeneous rms. One can construct and calibrate a model with a representative
rm and compare selected predictions of this model to a version of the same model
with many heterogeneous rms. If the predictions from the representative rm model
come close to those obtained from heterogeneous rm model, then the predictions of the
representative rm model are reliable.
Price decreases are common
Dhyne et al. (2006) report that 42% of price changes are decreases in the euro area.
While Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) nd this fraction to be roughly one-third in both
consumer prices excluding sales and nished-goods producer prices. Food and energy
price increases and decreases are almost equally likely. For industrial goods 43% price
changes are decreases. Price decreases are less common for services, for which they
constitute only 20% of price changes. However, micro data suggest that there is no
stronger downward nominal price stickiness.
The nding that price decreases are common has important implications for the cal-
ibration of models of price rigidity. As shown in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), the
fraction of price changes that are decreases helps to pin down the key parameters in
a benchmark menu costs model along the lines of Golosov and Lucas (2007). It also
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provides strong evidence for the hypothesis that idiosyncratic shocks are an important
driving force for price changes.
Downward sloping hazard function
A "dynamic" feature that has been documented in many studies is the shape of the hazard
function of price change. The general nding in the literature is that hazard function
is decreasing. Alvarez (2008) reports that the frequency of price changes conditional
on reaching a given age is downward sloping when all goods are considered together,
but note that this could be the consequence of heterogeneity in the probability of price
adjustment. For a price changed recently there is a high likelihood that the good is a
exible price good and so the probability of the occurrence of a price change is high;
for a price that has been unchanged for a long time it is likely that the good is a sticky
price good and the probability of price change is low. This is so called "selection e¤ect".
Hence the empirical hazard rate is downward sloping.
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) estimate the hazard function of price change for
consumer and producer prices, controlling for heterogeneity across products. The hazard
functions are downward sloping for the rst few months, then mostly at except for a
large twelve-month spike in all major groups. Accounting for heterogeneity leads to a
substantial attening of the hazard function. But they do not nd evidence to support for
upward sloping hazard function. Furthermore, they suggest that menu costs model can
generate a variety of shapes of hazard functions, depending on the relative importance
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of transitory and permanent shocks to marginal costs. Firms may be more attentive to
getting prices right when revenue is temporarily high for a product due to idiosyncratic
supply or demand considerations. Large idiosyncratic shocks tend to produce a downward
sloping hazard.
1.1.3 Summary
Previous research has demonstrated the importance of assessing the nominal price rigidity
using micro data. The stylized facts obtained from micro data can help us to examine
pricing behaviour at the rm level, where pricing decisions are actually made. Individual
information on price setting allows determining to which extent the assumptions used in
deriving theoretical models are actually realistic, which helps rene modeling strategies.
1.2 Research objectives
My thesis consists of three individual essays which all shed light on assessing the price
rigidity by using price micro data in the UK. The relevant implications for macro models
are also discussed in each essay respectively. My thesis mainly focuses on a few research
questions shown as follows:
1. How often do consumer prices change?
2. How can we deal with the censoring and sampling issue when the hazard function
is estimated from the UK CPI micro data?
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3. Would the probability of price change vary along the duration of price spells?
4. How can we derive the distribution across rms which is consistent with a given
mean frequency of price changes?
5. Whether the workhorse pricing models can t the empirical evidence in micro data,
if not, what can be done to rene modeling strategies?
6. What is the minimum (maximum) mean duration of price-spells averaged across
rms consistent with a given frequency of price changes?
7. Can we just use frequencies of price change to generate corresponding hypothetical
distributions which can match the "true" distribution across rms?
8. Do the DSGE models under the Calvo distribution hypothesis behave in a way
similar to models calibrated with the microdata ("true" DAF)?
9. How can we build a time-varying Ss model which has implication consistent with
the micro evidence found in the UK PPI micro data?
10. How can we evaluate the e¤ects of covariates on the hazard rate?
11. How can we control for the unobservable heterogeneity when hazard function is
estimated?
1.3 Research outline
The rest of this thesis can be briey described as following:
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In Chapter 2, I assess the price rigidity in a unied framework a la Dixon (2012), using
CPI micro data in the UK. I estimate the frequency of price change, given the information
about sales and substitutions. I give a detailed discussion about the e¤ect of censoring and
sampling on the estimation of hazard function. I derive the distribution across rms which
are consistent with a given mean frequency of price changes in terms of the corresponding
proportion of rms resetting prices. I exam pricing behaviour of two benchmark pricing
models: menu costs and Calvo. And I build models with heterogeneous structure in price
setting to improve modelstness in respect to matching microevidence.
In Chapter 3, I seek to analyze how much the frequency could tie down the behaviour
of rms in steady-state in terms of the average length of price spells across rms. I
derive an upper and lower bound for the mean duration of price-spells averaged across
rms. Then the UK CPI micro data at the aggregate and sectoral level are used to
nd that the actual mean is about twice the theoretical minimum consistent with the
observed frequency. I estimate the distribution using the hazard function and nd that
although the estimated hazard di¤ers signicantly from the Calvo distribution, the means
and medians are similar. However, despite the micro di¤erences, I nd that the articial
Calvo distributions generated using the sectoral frequencies result in very similar impulse
responses to the estimated hazard when used in the Smets-Wouters (2003) model.
In Chapter 4, I examine the behaviour of individual producer prices in the UK. A
number of stylized facts about price setting behaviour are uncovered. The weighted
average frequency of price change is 25%, and there are about 44% of price adjustments
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are price decreases. The frequency of price changes varies substantially across industry
groups and product sectors. The unconditional hazard function displays a downward
sloping pattern with annual spikes. Then I set up a time-varying Ss model which is
consistent with the micro evidence. Then a duration model is specied according to the
Ss model. I estimate the duration model which controls for observable and unobservable
heterogeneity across rms in assessing the e¤ect of changes in ination, interest rate, oil
price, industrial output, and exchange rate on the hazard rate of price changes.
In Chapter 5, I discuss the major ndings of this research. I also discuss the limitations
of this research and suggest areas for future research.
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Chapter 2
Frequency, Hazard Function, and
Distribution across Firms
2.1 Introduction
In monetary macroeconomics, the price rigidity plays a key role in many modelssetup.
Not only it a¤ects the "real e¤ect" of monetary policy and the dynamic of ination, but
it also has a deep inuence on optimal monetary policy. There are quite a few important
questions which need to be addressed in the micro price data set, such as: how often do
the consumer price and/or producer price change, would the probability of price change
vary along the duration of price spell, and what does the distribution of price durations
look like? Furthermore, we would like to investigate whether the workhorse pricing
models can t the empirical evidence in micro price data. In this chapter, we intend to
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indicate the stylized facts of the price setting mechanism in the UK economy, and take
important steps at discriminating among models by assessing the ability of "two of the
most popular models of price rigidity"the Calvo and menu costs models to match key
empirical features of rms price-setting behaviour we found in the UK CPI micro data.
Price stickiness has been studied at the level of individual rms since 1920s. Mills
(1927) and Means (1935) distinguish two types of products: the one with exible price,
and the other one with "administered price", and they nd that many prices change
infrequently and the frequency of price changes varies widely across goods. Their work
has spurred a voluminous literature. Early studies mainly focus on price adjustment for
particular products. Mussa (1981) and Weiss (1993) describe the behavior of newspaper
prices during the 1920s German hyperination. Carlton (1986) nds evidence on the
dynamics of industrial prices. Cecchetti (1986) investigates the magazine cover prices.
Lach and Tsiddon (1992) study the behavior of the prices of 26 foodstu¤s at grocery
store in Israel. Kashyap (1995) checks the catalogue product.
Recently, many researchers broaden the source of micro price data. Blinder et al
(1998) make surveys of rm managers. Eichenbaum, Jaimovich and Rebelo (2011) use
scanner data from supermarkets, drugstores, and mass merchandisers in the U.S. Cavallo
(2009) collects the online-shopping price data in Brazil.
Date sets underlying o¢ cial CPIs have become available to researchers since new
millennium. For the U.S., the leading research was conducted by Bils and Klenow (2004).
In their inuential work, they focus on the micro-data of CPIs between 1995 and 1997
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in U.S. They nd that the price rigidity is not serious. On average, the price can remain
the same for 3 to 4 months, which is much shorter than the estimate from macro model.
Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) both extend the work of
Bils and Klenow (2004) in di¤erent directions. Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) not only
investigate the CPI micro data, but also do the thorough research on PPI micro data. For
the euro area, Dhyne et al. (2006) have a good summary of all the related work done by
the members of Ination Persistence Network1. For the United Kingdom, Bunn and Ellis
(2012a) (BE hereafter) is the rst trial. Our study di¤ers from BE from three aspects.
First, we assess the price rigidity in a unied framework, which includes frequency, hazard
function, and distribution across rms. Second, we estimate the hazard function using
all the normal (uncensored) and right-censored price spells. Whereas BE only choose
one complete price spell for each item to estimate the hazard function. We point out
that not only this method su¤ers the loss of important information from discarding large
amount of spells, but also faces the problem of selection bias. Third, we derive out the
distribution of durations across rms. And we argue that the cross-sectional feature
of price setting behaviour is important to make macro-model t the micro-evidence, as
suggested by Dixon and Kara(2010).
Individual rms do not continuously adjust their prices in response to shocks that hit
1For the other countries: Baharad and Eden (2004) point out that the popular method adopted
by most researchers su¤er the over-sampling bias. They announce a method to correct the downward
bias in estimation of price rigidity. Gagnon (2007) investigates the price rigidity for Mexico during the
hyperination period. Kovanen (2006) gets the result for Sierra Leone; Goueva (2007) has the estimation
of price rigidity for Brazil; Masahiro and Saita (2007) report the conclusion for Japan; Hofstetter (2010)
provides evidence on how often prices change in Colombia.
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the economy. To model this fact, the economic literature considers mainly two types of
pricing behaviour: time dependent and state dependent pricing rules. According to the
former, rms are assumed to change their prices periodically using either a deterministic
(Taylor, 1980) or a stochastic (Calvo, 1983) process of price adjustment. More specically,
in the Calvo model, rms face a probability of optimizing their price, which is exogenous
and constant. Therefore, the timing of the price changes is exogenous and does not
depend either on the timing of the shocks or on the state of the economy. Due to its
tractability, the Calvo model enjoys popularity in the macroeconomic literature.
Firms following state-dependent pricing rules are usually assumed to review their
prices whenever relevant shocks hit the economy but, due to the existence of xed costs
of changing prices (e.g., the costs of printing and distributing new price lists), they change
their prices only when the di¤erence between the actual and target prices is large enough
(see, for example, Sheshinski and Weiss, 1977, Caplin and Spulber, 1987, Caballero and
Engel, 1993, Dotsey et al., 1999). Thus, a company facing these menu costs will change
its price less frequently than an otherwise identical rm without such costs.
There are debates on how to embed price stickiness inside macroeconomic models,
and whether one can construct a price-setting model consistent with the micro evidence
that has plausible macroeconomic implications.
In this chapter we examine the frequency of price changes underlying the UK CPI
micro data, with the consideration on the e¤ect of sales and substitutions. The major
aim is to analyze the degree of the nominal rigidity present in United Kingdom consumer
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prices and trying to applying a unied framework (proposed by Dixon, 2012) to study
the characteristics in price setting behaviour.
We nd that the monthly average frequency of price changes is 19 percent for identical
items in CPI micro data. Moreover, the frequency of price changes varies considerably
across sectors and products. For various fuel types and seasonal food products the
average frequency can be as high as 90 percent per month. However, for several services
and administered prices, such as automatic car wash, and digital photo printing, the
frequency can be as low as 3 percent per month. To provide a measure of distribution of
price durations across rms, we estimate the aggregate hazard function for all price spells.
Similar to previous studies, we nd that the aggregate hazard function is decreasing with
most marked annual spike. We derive the distribution of durations across rms from the
hazard function. In line with previous studies (Baharad and Eden 2004, Dixon 2009),
the distribution of duration across rms has fatter long tail than the distribution of
duration across contract, indicating that the price is stickier than we thought. Moreover,
the "stickier" sectors dominate the behaviour of ination in the longer term.
The potential contributions of this chapter are three folds: we rstly take empirical
study of price rigidity under the framework of distribution across rms. A unied frame-
work for using micro-data a la Dixon (2012) combines frequency method with hazard
function, and then derives the distribution across rms (hereafter DAF). Secondly, we in-
vestigate the censoring issue in detail, and discuss the di¤erent e¤ect on the estimation of
hazard function resulted from di¤erent method on dealing with right-censoring. Thirdly,
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we calibrate a benchmark menu costs model and Calvo model to match the evidence we
obtained from micro-data, and we check the implication of di¤erent pricing models with
heterogeneous structure.
The structure of the chapter is allocated as following: Section 2 provides the data
description and some specic data issues; Section 3 discusses the methodology used in
assessing price rigidity, pointing out the connection among frequency, hazard function
and DAF; Section 4 provides the empirical results we get from CPI micro data; Section
5 maps micro-evidence with macro model; Section 6 provides possible extension to the
benchmark pricing model; and in Section 7 we conclude.
2.2 Data
2.2.1 Date description
The micro data used in this paper are produced by the O¢ ce of National Statistics (ONS
hereafter), Because of the condentiality issues relating to information collected about
individual rms, it is not possible to makes this type of data widely available. The micro
data that underlie the consumer and producer price indices used in this research were
made accessible via the VML2.
2This work contains statistical data from ONS which is Crown copyright and reproduced with the
permission of the controller of HMSO and Queens Printer for Scotland. The use of the ONS statistical
data in this work does not imply the endorsement of the ONS in relation to the interpretation or
analysis of the statistical data. This work uses research data sets which may not exactly reproduce
National Statistics aggregates.
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2.2.2 CPI data
The ONS collect a longitudinal micro data set of monthly price quotes from over ten
thousands of outlets to compute the national index of consumer prices. There are two
basic price collection methods: local and central. Local collection is used for most items.
There are about 150 locations around country, and around 120,000 quotations are ob-
tained each month by local collection. For some items, collection in individual shops
across the 150 areas is not required- for example, for larger chain stores who have a
national pricing policy or where the price is the same for all UK residents or the regional
variation in prices can be collected centrally. Central collected data cover about 33% of
CPI, but they are not available to our research3. Therefore, our CPI research data mainly
are local collected, covering about two thirds of total CPI. The sample spans over the
time period from January 1996 to December 2007 and contains between 112,676 (1996)
and 99,524 (2007) elementary price quotations per month. And our data sample includes
over 14 million observations. The coverage and classication of the CPI indices are based
on the international classication system for household consumption expenditures known
as COICOP (classication of individual consumption by purpose). This is a hierarchical
classication system comprising: divisions e.g. 01 Food and non-alcoholic beverages,
groups e.g. 01.1 Food, and classes (the lowest published level) e.g. 01.1.1 Bread and
3The sample excludes 33% of CPI items which are central collected. The central collected data set
include price quotes for education, some of the energy goods, and some of the communication services.
However, we dont have the detail of the description. We do recognize the potential sample selection
bias. But the data availability is the most common issue in this kind of micro price data research. And
we argue that we have the most representative data set so far to full our research objectives.
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COICOP division Freq. Percent Cum.
Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages 25,191.51 17.62 17.62
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 10,083.28 7.05 24.67
Clothing and Footwear 13,323.33 9.32 33.98
Housing and Utilties 9,350.23 6.54 40.52
Furniture and Home Maintenance 16,211.75 11.34 51.86
Health 2,705.55 1.89 53.75
Transport 14,800.15 10.35 64.1
Communications 237.2797 0.17 64.27
Recreation and Culture 14,085.51 9.85 74.12
Education 6.340364 0 74.12
Restaurants and Hotels 25,087.06 17.54 91.67
Miscellaneous Goods and Services 11,918.02 8.33 100
Total 143,000 100
Table 2.1: CPI share in COICOP sectors
cereals. As table 2.1 shows4, the division Food and non-alcoholic beverages accounts for
about 17% of the CPI weight in the subsample available in the dataset. The education
division is excluded from our research due to the lack of observation.
In our CPI research data set, each individual price quote consists of information on the
item code, the outlet, the region, the date and etc. And we dene the product category
at the elementary level, for example, an item could be indicated as large loaf, white,
unsliced (800g). There are a total of 675 products categories in our raw dataset, and the
product varies by its specic variety and brand with each product category. However,
the data set has been anonymized with respect to the variety and brand of the product.
4Similar to the situation illustrated in Bunn and Ellis (2012a), only the locally collected data that
account for about two thirds of the CPI are available. While centrally collected data are not available for
the research. Therefore, the average weights in this study do not equal to the average weights underlying
o¢ cial CPI. This is in line with the nding in Bunn and Ellis (2012a, Figure 1). Specically, the average
weight of Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages in this study is about 17%, which is higher than the average
published CPI weight (about 12%) ; the average weight of Communication is this study is less than 1%,
while the average published CPI weight is about 2%.
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With the information on the item i, the shop j, the location k, and the date t, we can
construct a price trajectory Pijk;t, which is sequence of price quotes for a specic item
belonging to a product category in a specic shop over time. Specically, we take two
sequential price quotes belong to the same price trajectory if they have the same product
identity, location and shop code. There are about 614; 000 price trajectories. And the
average length of each price trajectory is about 24 months.
As Table 2.2 described, the average length of price trajectory di¤ers quite a lot among
di¤erent COICOP sectors. The sector with longest price trajectory in average is health
sector, indicating that the item belonging to health sector appear in CPI research data
as long as two and a half year. On contrary, an item in the communication sector
usually disappears from our CPI basket after one and a half year. It shows that the
communication sector is updated more frequently in CPI basket.
Furthermore, we can dene a price spell as the sequence of price quotes with the
same price for a specic item in a specic shop. The length of price spell (duration) is a
key factor when we assess the price rigidity. Moreover, the distribution of duration will
provide us a possible perspective to model the price rigidity. We will try to measure the
average length (duration) of price spell and get the distribution of duration in following
sector.
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COICOP Sector Mean length of price
trajectory
Median length of
price trajectory
Food and Non-Alcoholic
Beverages
26.0 21
Alcoholic Beverages and
Tobacco
28.6 22
Clothing and Footwear 19.6 13
Housing and Utilties 25.2 21
Furniture and Home
Maintenance
24.5 19
Health 30.1 23
Transport 26.7 23
Communications 18.7 12
Recreation and Culture 23.3 19
Education na na
Restaurants and Hotels 25.3 23
Miscellaneous Goods and
Services
26.1 22
Table 2.2: Average length of price trajectory by COICOP sector
2.2.3 Specic data issues
Censoring
Censoring is a word often used in survival analysis literature, which is dened as a
situation when the failure event occurs and the subject is not under observation. In this
paper, a failure event is specied as a price change. Suppose that the surveys sample
individual price quote between the date B and E (as in Figure2-1. The date B is the
beginning of the survey period, while date E is the ending of it. We dene a normal price
spell as the period between two price changes. Censoring occurs when you are prevented
from seeing the exact time of the failure event (price change, in our context).Therefore,
censoring entails a downward bias in the estimation of the duration of price spells, as
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longer price spells are more likely to be censored. In general, we can classify the price
spells into four groups with di¤erent censoring type as shown in Figure2-1:
1. Non-censored price spell, or normal price spell: we can observe the beginning and
ending of the price spell explicitly, which can be seen as S1 in Figure2-1
2. Left-censored price spell: if we do not know the true starting date of the price spell.
This usually happens when new item or product is introduced to CPI basket. S2
in Figure2-1 gives an example. Spells such as S4 may be recorded as a duration
beginning at B and lasting until the completion of the spell, in which case the
actual duration is unknown since the time from the inception of the spell to the
beginning of survey (B) is unknown.
3. Right-censored price spell: if we do not know the ending date of the price spell. E.g.
a product withdraws prematurely; a product no longer be available in an outlet, or
the outlet shut down; or at the end of sample period. We can illustrate this type
of spell as S3 in Figure2-1.
4. Double-censored price spell: as shown as S4 in Figure2-1,if both the start and
the end of the spell is not observed, i.e. the price spell of the product actually
begins before the statistical agency starts to observe the product, and ends after
the statistical agency stops to observe the product.
We can summarize the reasons which can explain the censored price spells in our
observations. First, the observation period is restricted by the database availability.
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Figure 2-1: Type of price spells
This makes it very likely to observe product prices in a given outlet after the current
price of the product was actually set and/or before that price ceases to exist. Indeed, the
probability that the rst spell in a price trajectory is left-censored is high, as is one of
the last spell being right-censored. Second, the sampling of products and outlets by the
statistical agency is also likely to generate some censoring. Indeed, the statistical institute
may decide to discard a specic product from the "representative" CPI basket due to
changes in technology or consumer behavior that shrink the expenditure share on these
products (e.g. black and white TV sets) although they may still be sold in outlets. Then,
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the last price spell of such a product will be right-censored. Conversely, products may
be included in the CPI basket and their price observed after they were actually available
for consumers. This will generate left-censoring of the price spell. Third, outlets and
rms may decide to stop selling a product which price was followed by the statistical
agency. Then, the procedure which is often adopted by statistical agencies in charge of
computing the CPI consists in replacing the "old product" by another one, either a close
substitute in the same outlet or the same product but in another outlet. It is then very
likely that the price of the "replacing product" was set before the rst price observation
for this product. We then have left-censoring of the price spell for this new product.
In our CPI data set, there are over 3 million price spells. The majority of price spells
are uncensored, covering 42% of whole sample; the share of left-censored price spells is
20%; the share of right-censored price spells is 30%; and the share of double-censored
price spells is 8%5.
Sales
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) suggest that temporary sales have "strikingly di¤erent
macroeconomic implications". Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011) point out that sales have
important implication on monetary policy. The ONS gathers consumer price data on
whether a product was "on sale" or "recovering from sale" when its price was sampled
in a particular month. Sales prices are recorded if they are temporary reductions on
5Double censored price spells are 8% of the sample. However, it does not mean that 8% of prices were
unchanged for 12 years. It is because that sometimes a shop is shut down or an item is out of stock.
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goods likely to be available again at normal prices or end of season reductions. Prices
in closing down sales and for special purchase of end of range, damaged, shop soiled or
defective goods are not recorded as they are deemed not to be the same quality as, or
comparable with, goods previously priced or those likely to be available in future. We
identify temporary "sales" with the ag provided by ONS6. However, alternative "sales"
lters are proposed by other researchers. There are three kinds of price lters used by
previous studies:
1. The AC Neilsen lter, which is used by Kehoe and Midrigan (2007) (KM hereafter),
indicates a sale if "price decrease is followed by any price increase thereafter".
2. Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) (NK hereafter)suggest a sale lter that ag a sale
only when a price decrease is followed by a return to the price in e¤ect just before
the decrease.
3. Eichenbaum, Jaimovich and Rebelo (2010) (EJR hereafter) identify the most fre-
quently observed price in a given quarter as "reference price", which means that
it excludes an even larger portion of price changes than sale lters, yielding "more
persistent series and suggesting a stronger role for nominal rigidities."7
The EJR lter restricts regular prices to change only on certain dates, and therefore
greatly increases estimates of price persistence. The KM lter is much more likely to
6All the discounting available for all customers are recorded by ONS, labelled as sale. While dis-
counting only available for loyalty card members are not recorded by ONS.
7Chahrour (2010) proposes a new price lter similar to the EJR (2010) and show that implications
for price duration depend on the choice of lter.
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records a sale even if it is a reversion in regular price, and therefore it may identify
spurious sales. The NS lter is more strict, which will typically identify fewer sales and
more frequent price changes. We choose NS lter to identify the "sales", however, the
empirical nding suggests that there is trivial di¤erence between NS lter and ONSsale
ag. Furthermore, we nd that sales have some kind of "seasonal pattern", which can
be shown in Figure 2-2.
Figure 2-2: Sales as percentage of total price quotes in each calendar month
Concerning the price changes associated to sales we decided to follow a dual approach:
In the baseline version of the results we treat sales as regular price changes which ter-
minate a price spell. However, it can be argued that these price changes merely reect
noise in the price setting process and are not due to changes in fundamental price deter-
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mining factors (as e.g. monetary policy and business cycle developments) and therefore
they should be ignored from the viewpoint of monetary policy analysis8. Therefore, we
also provide an alternative set of results without taking into account the price changes
induced by sales. In order to exclude price changes induced by agged sales from our
analysis, we replace all agged sales prices with the last regular price9, i.e. the price
before the sale started.
The sales price quotes account for about 7% of whole sample10. It is lower than the
share of sales prices in the US CPI data, which account for about 20% (Nakamura and
Steinsson,2008). There is signicant di¤erence in our estimation of price rigidity if we
choose to include or exclude sales data.
Substitutions
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) claim that the importance of substitution draws atten-
tion to the question of whether the relative frequency of di¤erent types of price changes
is an important determinant of the macroeconomic implications of price rigidity.As a
measure of price change alone, the CPI should reect the cost of buying a xed basket
of goods and services of constant quality. However, products often disappear or are re-
8However, Guimaraes and Sheedy (2007) argue that even if rms can adjust sales without cost,
monetary policy has large real e¤ects owing to sales being strategic substitution. Thus the exibility
seen in individual prices due to sales does not translate into exibility of the aggregate price level.
9However, Eichenbaum et al. (2009) replace sale prices with reference prices which dened as the
most common prices within a given quarter.
10Some authors, e.g. Baumgartner et al 2005, argue that the reporting of sales is generally up to the
interviewer and therefore cannot be expected to be complete and consistent across all products. They
additionally dene a "v-shaped" sale indicator. However, this lter generates substantial fraction of sales
when prices are perfectly exible.
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placed with new versions of a di¤erent quality or specication, and brand new products
also become available. When such a situation arises, direct comparison is adopted. If
there is another product which is directly comparable (that is, it is so similar to the old
one that it can be assumed to have the same base price), for example a garment identical
except that it is a di¤erent colour, then the new one directly replaces the old one and its
base price remains the same. This is described as "obtaining a replacement which may be
treated as essentially identical" (CPI Technical Manual,2007), and is equivalent to saying
that any di¤erence in price level between the new and the old product is entirely due to
price change and not quality di¤erences. In CPI data, such "comparable" substitution
is not uncommon. It accounts for a little more than 4 percent of our total CPI research
dataset. The substitution happens more likely in the January, August, and September.
This partially reects the fact that ONS adjust the basket of CPI in the beginning of the
year. Beside, the clothing and footwear are more likely to change the style when summer
ends. We can show the substitutions as percentage in whole price quotes in each calendar
month as Figure 2-3.
Outliers
We remove some price quotes from the data set mainly because they display unrealistic
price movements. We set a very large pre-dened threshold value. Any individual price
changes exceed this value will be detected as outliers and excluded from our study. We
dont want to apply a harsh lter here. Therefore, only if individual price changes with
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Figure 2-3: Substitution as percentage of total price quotes in each calendar month
(Pijk;t   Pijk;t 1)=Pijk;t 1 > 100 will be dened as outliers. This is such a conservative
rule that only a few observations have to be discarded. The percentage of the exclusion is
very trivial, less than 0.01%. Robustness checks have done on frequency of price changes.
And it does not alter our result. However, it will a¤ect the mean size of price changes
in some specic time periods for a few specic items. Though we do not focus on the
magnitude of price changes. We only exclude the zero price quotes (prices dropping to
zero) as outlier. Once again, the data treatment does not alter our results on frequencies
of price changes.
42
Data Gaps
After removing the outliers from our data set, we faces the gaps in our data set. Specif-
ically, the price quotes for some items are missing during some periods. This situation
would be even worse when we exclude the sales and substitutions from our data set.
We have to ll the gaps when we estimate the duration of price spells. Therefore, we
adopt a "carry forward" strategy. In another word, we will ll the gaps with the last
observable price. This strategy is consistent with Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008). But it
will generate upward bias in estimating the duration of price spells. In order to make this
potential bias as small as possible, we add another restriction when we adopt the "carry
forward" strategy. That is, we only ll the gaps not longer than 3 months. If the gaps
are longer than 3 months, we consider the later one be a new price spell. This 3-month
window is also used by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) when they construct their own
sale lter. Alternative treatment would be treating the missing data as loss. Then
this would e¤ectively increase the right censoring and left censoring observations, but
to a very slightly higher level (less than 1%). However, our results are not signicantly
a¤ected.
Weights
In CPI dataset, each individual price quote is attached with weight, which is given
by ONS. The CPI weights cover monetary expenditure within the UK on goods and
services. The weights are based on expenditure within the domestic territory by all
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private households, foreign visitors to the UK and residents of institutions. The individual
weights11 which initially do not sum to one as not 100 percent of the CPI is covered in
our sample, are then rescaled such that the sum of the weights equals one and the relative
weights among the goods are preserved.
2.3 A unied framework in assessing price rigidity
In this section, we provide a unied framework in assessing price rigidity from three
perspectives: the frequency, the hazard function method, and the distribution of duration
across rms.
2.3.1 Frequency
The frequency of price changes is given for each product as the number of price changes
in each period over the total number of price quotes for that product in that period.
We assume that the proportion of rms resetting price corresponds to the proportion of
prices changing. It imply that each price trajectory corresponds to a di¤erent rm. We
11The weights are used at the itemlevel, which is the most disaggregated level. More specically,
the weights are assigned to a specic item sold in a specic shop belonging to a specic location.
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can use dummies Ij;t to dene the price change12:
8>><>>:
Ij;t = 0 if Pj;t = Pj;t 1
Ij;t = 1 if Pj;t 6= Pj;t 1
where Pj;t and Pj;t 1 belong to the same trajectory. Similarly, we can dene the price
increase/decrease with dummies:
8>><>>:
Uj;t = 1 if Ij;t = 1&Pj;t > Pj;t 1
Uj;t = 0 all else
8>><>>:
Dj;t = 1 if Ij;t = 1&Pj;t < Pj;t 1
Dj;t = 0 all else
And the weighted average frequency of price changes is dened as
f =
PT
t=1
PJ
j=1 !j;tIj;tPT
t=1
PJ
j=1 !j;t
;
The frequency approach now is standard in the empirical sticky-price literature13. It has
following advantages:
12This is a kind of backward comparing scheme. This method is used by a lot of researchers, such as
Fougere et al. (2007), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), Bunn and Ellis (2012a). The price change can
also be dened in a forward comparing way. However, we argue that when sample is big enough. The
estimates from two methods are consistent.
13We estimate the frequency of price changes by using STATA, which include standard command to
calculate the weighted mean (frequency of price changes). The incorrect formula (a typo in previous
version) was not used.
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1. not require a long span of data.
2. allows to use the maximum amount of information from the data.
3. does not require an explicit treatment of the censoring of price spell.
The measure f is an average incorporating price changes of all rms and over all
periods of time. It can also be interpreted as a ow of new contracts in each period.
In discrete time, the frequency of price change f implies an average of price duration:
d =
1
f
;
while in continuous time14 framework (as Bils and Klenow 2004, Nakamura and Steinsson
2008), the implied average duration equals:
d =
 1
ln(1  f)
Whther we choose a discrete or continuous setup, there are a number of di¢ culties with
the concept of implied duration:
1. The method above makes the simplifying assumption of constant hazards, where
the probability of a price change is independent from the amount of time elapsed
since the previous adjustment.
14The prices can change within a month.
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2. The estimator to be consistent, homogeneity of observations in the cross-sectional
dimension is required.
3. The estimator su¤ers downward aggregation bias due to the Jensen inequality.
Specically, under the situation where heterogeneity exists, we have:1=E (x) <
E (1=x) (Baharad and Eden,2004).
2.3.2 Hazard function
We start to think about a price spell j; which begins at time tj;start and remains until
some time point tj;end where the precise date tj;end is not known but is observed to be
somewhere between dates t   1 and t,due to the discrete nature of sampling. However,
we can be sure that the price spell has kept on more than t   1 months and at most t
months. Hence, we can dene the probability for a price change to occur after some time
has elapsed since the previous price change. First,we have the probability for a spell to
last at least t  1 months (the survivor function) as:
Pr (T  t  1) = 
 (t  1)
= 1  F (t  1)
where 
 () and F () are the survivor function and the cumulative density function of T
correspondingly. After that, we can dene the probability that price spell keeps on at
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least t  1 months but less than t months as:
Pr (t  1 < T  t) = F (t)  F (t  1)
= 
 (t  1)  
 (t) :
We introduce the concept of hazard function !t , which is the instantaneous probability
of price change at month t, conditional on the price not changing until that point in
time. It can be shown as a function of cumulative density function F () or the survivor
function 
 ():
!t = Pr (t  1 < T  tjT > t  1)
=
Pr (t  1 < T  t)
Pr (T > t  1)
=
F (t)  F (t  1)
1  F (t  1)
=

 (t  1)  
 (t)

 (t  1)
= 1  
 (t)

 (t  1) :
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If we dene the distribution of ages in steady-state as A 2 F 1M ,15 the corresponding
hazard rate is given by
!i =
Ai   Ai+1
Ai
, i = 1;    ; F   1
!F = 1
Here the Ai are monotonic decreasing
16, Ai  1 with AF+1 = 0. Accordingly, we can
derive the survival probability as the probability at birth that the price survives for at
least i periods, with 
1 = 117 and for i = 2; : : : ; T

i =
i 1Y
k=1
(1  !k)
and the sum of survival rates is X


=
TX
i=1

i
Proposition 1 If we dene $ = 1P


, then at steady state, the frequency of price change
f equals $:
Proof. Think of the age distribution: in steady state, the ow of new contracts is f .
The share of each age is f 
i, i = 1; : : : ; T . The sum of all shares of age distribution is
15The age of rms price-spell is the period of time that has elapsed since the price spell started.
Subscript M refers to monotonicity; supscript A refers to age.
16We cannot have more older price spells than younger price spells, since to become old must rst be
young.
17Here we assume the price can last at least a month. This is in line with the frequency of sampling
by ONS in constructing the CPI.
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one. Therefore,
TX
i=1
f  
i = 1
) f 
TX
i=1

i = 1
) f = 1PT
i=1
i
) f = $
We estimate the hazard function using Survival Analysis, widely used in the life sci-
ence to study the time elapsed from the "onset of risk" until the occurrence of a "failure"
event. Economists mostly use survival analysis to study unemployment spells. In our
practice, we estimate hazard function based on Kaplan-Meier nonparametric estimator,
since it does not need for the assumption of the distribution and is purely data driven.
However, some adjustments are needed:
1. in discrete time macroeconomic framework, the rm believes that it has a proba-
bility of 1 that its price lasts for at least one period, so 
1 = 1;
2. we reconcile the estimated hazard function with the data on the proportion of rms
changing price per month, as the lemma above tells, $ = f
Next, we dene the set of price spells for the estimation of the hazard function. There
is no agreement in literature about the selection of price spells in estimating the hazard
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function. Some use uncensored price spells, arguing that these price spells are properly
dened, while the censored price spells are much vague in this sense, such as Klenow and
Kryvtsov (2008). Some just pick one complete price spell in each price trajectory to make
the estimation (Bunn and Ellis 2012a). These treatments are quite ad hoc. Therefore, we
will quite a few options in estimating hazard function and get some preliminary results.
First, we categorize the price spells into four groups, and estimate hazard function
within each groups.
1. Uncensored price spells only group. For each price spells, a price change happens
at the end. Therefore, all censored spells are excluded. The gure 2-4 reports that
during the rst a few months, the hazard function is downward sloping. Then it
becomes relatively at, with signicant 12 month spike. This nding is consistent
with the previous ndings in other countries, such as Alvarez et al.(2005) and
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). However, the reciprocal of sum of survival rates
$ = 0:29, which is too much higher than the frequency of price change we directly
calculated from whole sample. This indicates that the uncensored price spells
scheme su¤er the loss of long price spells.
2. Left censored price spells only group. The reciprocal of sum of survivor rate $ =
0:18. As Figure 2-5 shows, the shape of hazard function is similar to what we
get from the normal price spell, though with smaller annual spikes. The biggest
problem when we included the left censored price spell is that we do not really know
when the price spells start. The statistical treatment of such spells induces more
51
Figure 2-4: Hazard function for normal price spells
di¢ culties than accounting for the sole right-censoring. However, the sample we
have is made of thousands of spells for similar products in quite similar outlets -i.e.
we have many spells that concern a given particular product sold in a given type
of outlet (e.g. in small corner grocery shops, or in supermarkets). Excluding the
left censored spells will not result in a substantial loss of information nor produce
a selection bias as the left-censoring is independent of the duration of price spells.
Therefore, following most literature, we will not include the left censored price
spells.
3. Right censored price spells only group. As shown in the Figure 2-618, the hazard
18For the right censored price spells, there are no dened end of price spells, since no price changes
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Figure 2-5: Hazard function for left-censored price spells
function is quite smooth comparing to the last two situations. It is also downward
sloping for rst a few months, and then becomes relative at. No annual spike
is found here. The implied frequency of price change $ = 0:16, indicating that
right-censored spells tend to belong to those long lasting spells.
4. Double censored price spells only group. The double censored price spells are most
likely to be very long price spells. Therefore, this group features extremely sticky
prices. And the result proves our hypothesis. The implied frequency of price change
$ = 0:09: As Figure 2-7 shows, the hazard function shows about yearly large spikes,
are observed. We assume price spells end at the last observation. The same assumption is also made
when we estimate the hazard function for the double-censored price spells.
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Figure 2-6: Hazard function for right-censored price spells
indicating that the statistical agency usually updates the basket annually.
Second, we focus on the mix group with normal price spells and right-censoring price
spells. We distinguish the estimations of hazard function by treating right-censoring
as "failure" (the same as price change) or as "loss" (out of scope of observation, not
necessarily end at that point of time):
1. The rst assumption about right censoring is adopted by Kaplan-Meier estimator
for the survival probability, which treats the right censoring as loss. This method
assumes that the right censoring price spell keep the same price on to the end of
estimated period. Especially, we dene the number of price spells that have lasted
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Figure 2-7: Hazard function for double-censored price spells
up to the ith period as ni, of these, fi fail (price-change), li are lost due to the right
censoring, which is dened in the previous sub-section. The basic KM estimator
for the survival probability up to period i is:
b
 (i) = iY
j=1

1  fj
nj

The key assumption here is that failure and loss are mutually exclusive, too strong
assumption in our case.
2. The other assumption on right censoring is to treat it as failure. Therefore, the
right-censoring is the same as price change. Both end a price spell denitely. Again,
this is kind of strong and ad hoc assumption. Under this assumption, the survival
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probability can be calculated as:
b
 (i) = iY
j=1

1  fj + lj
nj

We provide a kind of sensitivity analysis to check how robust our results from these
two assumptions among di¤erent data samples in CPI micro data. The detail of
the results will be reported in next section.
2.3.3 Distribution across Firms (DAF)
The distribution across rms in our context corresponds to the cross-section of completed
price-spells, which implies the average completed price-spell across rms. This concept
shed light on the fact that rms set price. In order to measure nominal rigidity in
meaningful way, we must focus on the behavior of rms. "The degree of nominal rigidity
is the average over time prices remain unchanged for a typical rm in the economy"
(Dixon, 2012). This is in contrast with the concept of the average length of a price-spell
across contracts, a measure that is frequently used (e.g. Bils and Klenow 2004, Nakamura
and Steinsson 2008). The empirical evidence shows that short price spells are dominant,
because they more likely to be counted. In the conventional method (distribution across
contracts), such assumptions are made: each price spell is unique and there is no link
between di¤erent price spells. However, taking the average over price-spells (distribution
across contracts) gives an excessive weight to short durations, moreover, it is in e¤ect
ignoring the panel structure and the fact that it is rms which are generating the price-
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spells. The conventional method also generates an underestimation of the actual degree
of nominal rigidity in an economy as argued by Baharad and Eden (2004), Ho¤man and
Kurz-Kim (2006), and Dixon (2012). Furthermore, we can justify the reason that we
should look at the cross-sectional measure from rms and/or householdspoint of view.
When rms set price, they maximize the discounted sum of future prots up to some
time T (which may be innite). Thus the weight put on a particular price spell is, in a
sense, "proportionate" to its duration, notwithstanding the e¤ects of discounting. Since
the objective function is additive across time, a longer duration adds more items into the
summation than a shorter one. Hence rms pay attention to the ow of prots earned
during price-spells roughly proportionate to their duration, given discounting. The cross-
sectional approach (DAF) is a form of length-biased sampling, which weights price-spells
in proportion to their duration. This enables us to focus on the behavior of the rms
which are generating the price-spells. Moreover, the information on sequence of price-
spells generated by the same rm over time is fully used. This is obviously an advantage
over some so-called one spell per rm sampling scheme. We will check this result later.
The cross-sectional distribution of completed price-spell across rms is just another
di¤erent way to look at the same object: a panel of price events. Each row of the panel
is a cross-section of all of the prices set by rms at a point in time. Each column is a
trajectory of prices corresponding to a particular rm. And we can nd a 1-1 mapping
from hazard rates to completed price-spells across rms originally proposed by Dixon
(2012).
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Proposition 2 Given the hazard rate ! 2 [0; 1]F 1, there exists a unique  2 F 1M
corresponding to !
i = i  !  
i  !i , i = 1;    ; F (2.1)
Proof. The proportion of rms that have a contract that last for exactly 1 period are
those are born (age1) and do not go on the age 2. The proportion of rms that last for
exactly i periods in any one cohort (born at the same time) is given by those who attain
the age i but who do not make it to i+1: this is ! 
i !i.Given the ow of new contracts
is f = ! each period. To survive for exactly i periods, you have to survive to period i
which happens with probability 
i, and then start a new contract which happens with
probability !i. Hence from a single cohort !  
i  !i will have contracts that last for
exactly i periods. Clearly, We can sum over the i cohorts (to include all of the contracts
which are in the various stages moving towards their nal period i) to get the expression.
FX
i=1
i =
FX
i=1
i (!  
i  !i)
=
FX
i=1
i
 
Ai  !i

=
FX
i=1
i
 
Ai   Ai+1

=
 
A1   A2

+ 2
 
A2   A3

+ 3
 
A3   A4

+   + F  AF
=
FX
i=1
Ai
= 1
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Hence  2F 1.The derivation of second equation can be referred to Observation 1 by
Dixon (2012). Rearranging the F   1 equations (2.1) we have:
1
!
= !1;
2
2!
= !2 (1  !1) ;    ; i
i  ! = !i
i;    ;
F
F!
= 
F:
In terms of cross-section, we are in e¤ect selecting over all price events in the cross-
section. The probability of a price-spell being observed is proportional to its length: a
8-period spell is 8 times more likely to be observed than a 1-period spell. Now, for a
given mean frequency of prices change f , there are many distributions of duration across
rms fig consistent with that mean frequency. Since we know from Proposition 1 that
the mean frequency of price change equals the ow of new contracts in each period f = !,
we can dene the mapping H (!) : [0; 1]! F 1
H (!) =
(
 2 F 1 :
FX
i=1
i
i
= !
)
H (!) is the set of all DAFs which are consistent with a given mean frequency of price
changes expressed in terms of the corresponding proportion of rms resetting prices !.
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2.4 Empirical ndings from micro data19
2.4.1 Frequency of price change
As described in previous sector, the frequency of price changes is computed as the ratio
of observed price changes to all valid price records. Thus, this measure is an average
incorporating price changes of all rms where the product has been recorded and over all
periods of time. In Tables 2.3 to 2:5, the results aggregated on the COICOP division and
CPI sectors are presented. On average, 21 percent of all prices are changed every month.
Therefore, there is overwhelming evidence that most products exhibit a signicant degree
of price stickiness. Our nding is somehow between those in the US and in the Euro area.
Bils and Klenow (2004) report that the average monthly frequency of price adjustment is
about 25 percent in the US, while Dhyne et al. (2005) report the share of price adjustment
is around 15 percent each month in Euro area. If we exclude the price quotes which are
indicated by "Sales", the frequency of price changes is 17 percent, showing that during
the sales period the prices change more frequently. If we exclude the price quotes which
are indicated by "Substitution", the result of frequency drops to 19 percent. If, say,
we only look at the regular prices, or the prices excluding both sales and substitutions,
the result of frequency is 15 percent only. Moreover, the frequency of price changes
varies considerably (see Table 5). Energy goods display a rather high frequency of price
19We provide empirical evidence about frequency of price changes, hazard functions, and
DAF. We do not provide detailed empirical ndings about the magnitude of price changes
since this chapter is not focus on this issue. However, we do nd that the size of price
change on average is 15%. And there is signicant heterogeneity in the magnitude of price
change among di¤erent COICOP sectors.
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changes (65 percent) and thus a short implied duration. Within these categories fuels of
di¤erent types are most exible. This is in line with the others nd with weekly data
(Eichenbaum, Jaimovich and Rebelo 2011), since fuel prices are indeed changed with a
very high frequency - sometimes even on a daily basis. In contrast, some service items as
well as products with administered prices display a very low frequency of price changes
and, on average, a duration which is almost three times as long as for unprocessed food.
For example, automatic car wash, parking and digital photo printing show an estimated
average duration of 24 months or longer.
Table 2.3 report the mean frequency of prices change (including sales and substi-
tutions) for each COICOP Division. The division "Transport" is the one with highest
frequency of 36 percent per month, which means that more than one third of items in this
division will reset the prices each month. The sales and substitutions play a trivial role in
this division. The division "Clothing and Footwear" also change their prices frequently,
as high as 27 percent per month, but largely due to sales and product substitution. After
excluding the e¤ect from sales and substitutions, the "Regular Price" in this division,
actually, is quite sticky (frequency drops to only 8.9 percent per month). Our nding is
consistent with what reported in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). In the Table II of NSs
paper, they report that the major group "Transportation goods", on average, about 31
percent of prices/ regular prices change each month. While the frequency varies dra-
matically between posted prices and regular prices in the major group "Apparel". This
is because many clothes undergo sales and substitution at the beginning of the spring
61
and fall seasons. In addition, the "Recreation and Culture" division also has high rate
of substitution, close to 5 percent. As argued in NS (2008), the timing of product sub-
stitution is primarily motivated by factors such as product cycles, fashion, and seasonal
demand variation rather than a rms desire to change its price. Price changes often
occur as introduction of new products. However, the introduction of new products is
not due to the misprice of the old products. Therefore, the "selection e¤ect associated
with price changes for identical items" may be stronger than for price changes because of
product substitution (Nakamura and Steinsson 2008). Since the e¤ect associated with
substitution is quite di¤erent from the price changes for identical items, we calibrate our
benchmark models in section 5 in accordance with the ndings in the micro price dataset
without substitutions.
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If we analyze price increases and decreases separately and excluding the e¤ect of sub-
stitution, we realize that price increase more often than they decrease: the frequency of
price increase is 11 percent compared to 8 percent for price decreases. Exceptions from
this pattern can be found in the categories, e.g. "clothing &foot wear" and "communi-
cation", where price decreases appear more frequent than price increases. Moreover, if
we look at the share of price increase/decrease in the total price changes, we can nd
that the price increases account for roughly 60 percent of price changes, whereas the
price decreases account for the remaining 40 percent. Therefore, from the evidence of
the frequency of price changes, we do not nd signicant downward price change rigidity,
which is in contrast with some theories.
It is true that this study only covers a part of Great Moderationperiod. During
this period, ination was relatively low, and the price decreases are not uncommon.
This nding is consistent with one of ve facts about prices in the U.S established
by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). In their paper, they claimed that one-third of
nonsale price changes are price decreases. In Bunn and Ellis (2012a), they also nd
that across the CPI microdata as whole, 45% of the changes in goods price changes
are falls. However, as pointed out by Gagnon (2008), price decreases are key to the
dramatically di¤erent behaviours of low- and high- ination economies. Gagnon (2008)
nd that the frequency of price decreases diminishes rapidly as ination rises from 0
to 10-15%. According to Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), we should interpret these
results with caution given the small amount of ination variability over the period we
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consider.
As has been mentioned before, the results on the frequencies of price changes and
implied duration of price spells are also computed without sales. For all product groups
the frequency of price changes have to be smaller (or equal) compared to the gures
in the "Prices" column. As expected, these e¤ects are most pronounced for food and
alcoholic beverages where temporary promotions are a common practice to attract new
customers, as well as for cloth and footwear where end of season sales are a common
practice to clear inventories.
We can also calculate the average frequency of price changes for each calendar month.
When looking at the frequency of price changes over each month we can see that there
is a clear seasonal pattern visible in Figure 2-8 20: The spikes in January indicate that
most prices are changed in January. More specically, price decreases are more likely to
be observed in January. This is partly due to the post-Christmas sales. Price increases
are more common during April, since many utility bills tend to rise at the beginning
of a nancial year. A modest jump in the frequency of prices decreases in July may
reect the summer sales in clothing and footwear. We also plot annually frequency of
price changes. As Figure 2-921 shows, there is no trend in the annual frequency of price
changes visible over the period considered. Furthermore, price increases and decreases
show a similar pattern over years.
20Ch, Ch Up and Ch Dn represent frequency of overall price changes, frequency of price increase, and
frequency of price decrease respectively.
21Ch, Ch.Up and Ch.Dn represent frequency of overall price changes, frequency of price increase, and
frequency of price decrease.
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Figure 2-8: Frequency of price changes in each calendar month
2.4.2 Hazard function
Aggregate hazard function
We remove all the left-censored and double-censored spells from the original dataset prior
to estimation. Indeed, spells that are double-censored are very likely to be very long,
typically longer than 11 months. However, this exclusion, as suggested by Heckman
and Singer (1984), helps to avoid making non-testable assumptions on the price setting
behaviour before the start of the observation period. As discussed in previous subsection,
we make two di¤erent assumptions on the last observation of right-censored price spells.
Since we cannot observe a price change at the end of right-censored price spells, there
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Figure 2-9: Frequency of price changes in each year
is no cut clear denition on hazard rate at that point of time. We could either assume
an articial price change happens at the end of right-censored price spell, or we could
assume that the right-censored price spell is keeping on going which can last forever
and beyond our observation. Therefore, we can plot the Kaplan-Meier Hazard functions
based on two assumptions in the following Figure 2-10. As can be seen from Figure
2-10, those two hazard function have similar shape, both are downward sloping for rst
few months and then becoming relatively at with large annual spike. In the rst few
months, the two curves stay quite close. However, as period becomes longer, the gap
between two curves becomes more signicant. This is due to the fact that as time goes
by, the right-censoring is more likely to appear. The hazard rate would be lower if we
assume the price spell lasts even out of our observation.
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Figure 2-10: Aggregate hazard function for consumer prices
The downward sloping hazard function, taken at face value, means that the probability
that a rm will change its price may be lower as it has kept it unchanged longer. It may
seem count-intuitive at rst glance. However, we can look at this in an alternative
way. As we are estimating the aggregate hazard function, which includes the rms with
sticky pricing strategies and those with exible pricing strategies. The rms with exible
pricing strategies are more likely to be in the "young age" zone. As rms become older,
the share of price changes by rms with exible pricing strategy will decrease. As argued
in Alvarez (2008), only price changes which belong to sticky rms can be observed at high
ages. The downward slope of hazard function reects the "aggregation of heterogeneous
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price setters".
In light of state dependent pricing models, the declining hazard may be explained by
the variation in the "Ss band", or the width of the inaction region (Klenow and Kryvtsov
2008). Lets consider the following scenerio: When a rm faces persistent idiosyncratic
shock with high level, it tends to sell a large quantity under a low price. Therefore, the
prot of the rm is mainly decided by choosing the right price. This will lead to a narrow
Ss band. However, when the idiosyncratic shock is at low level, the rms inaction region
becomes wider. Furthermore, when Ss band is narrow and hazard rate is high, the young
prices are more common; while the old prices are more common when Ss band is wider
and hazard rate is lower.
The existence of annual spikes is a reection of the seasonality that is present in most
quantitative study using micro price data. The annual spikes we nd in aggregate hazard
function is consistent with Taylor type price setters or the annual Calvo model of Alvarez
et al.(2005). These spikes could also arise in models with information cost. Moreover,
these spikes may reect the seasonality of demand or cost shock.
Hazard Function by Each Major Group
As shown in the previous subsection, the frequency of price adjustment varies a lot
between di¤erent CPI major groups. There is heterogeneity in price adjustment across
rms selling di¤erent products. As shown in Figure2-11, the hazard function for non-
energy goods is downward sloping in rst three months, and becomes relatively at
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afterwards. The highest hazard rate appears in the rst month, showing that there are
a lot of short price spells in this product category. Moreover, there are annual spikes
in the hazard function, indicating sort of Taylor-type contract scheme. The Figure 2-12
reports the hazard function for household service. It is contrast to the hazard function
for non-energy goods. There are quarter spikes in this hazard function, reecting the
facts that the Taylor-type contracts are more common in the service market than in the
goods market.
Figure 2-11: Hazard function for non-energy goods
Bunn and EllisMethod Revisited
In Bunn and Ellis (2012a) work, they estimate the hazard function by choosing one
price spell only in each price trajectory. We argue that this kind of treatment su¤ers
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Figure 2-12: Hazard function for household service.
information loss. Moreover, the sampling scheme in BE (2012a) is not random. Therefore,
it may su¤er the sampling bias. If we estimate the frequency of price change in BEs
subsample, we can nd that the frequency of price change drops to 12%, which can not
reect the aggregate exibility in price-setting behaviour. A large amount of short spells
are excluded from their subsample. If we draw our hazard function, which is estimated by
using all the non-left censored price spells, we can nd our estimation di¤ers from BEs
in the rst 6 months. Especially for the rst 3 months, our estimation of hazard rate lies
high above the BEs, indicating that the BEs estimation ignores the most exible part
in the price-setting. However, after 8 months, two estimations become relatively closer.
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Figure 2-13: Comparison of ours and BEs estimation of hazard function.
2.4.3 Distribution of Durations across Firms
Dixon (2012) argues that "price spells across time are linked by the fact that they are
set by the same rm", and "focusing on the distribution of durations (across contracts)
is in e¤ect ignoring the panel structure and the fact that it is rms which are generating
the price spells". Since we have obtained the hazard function from the estimation on all
non-left-censoring spells (right-censorings are treated as failure), the distribution across
rms (DAF) can be estimated as Equation (2.1). Hence, we can depict the DAF as Figure
2-14. The rst feature observed here is that the share of one-month price spells is the
largest. This reects that there are many exible price-setters in the economy, even after
we correct the oversampling issue. The second feature is that the DAF is decreasing with
a spike around 12 months. The third feature is that there is fat tailsticking up at the
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Figure 2-14: Distribution of durations across rms.
end. This feature becomes more clearly when we compare the DAF with the conventional
distribution of durations across contracts.
According to Dixon (2012), it is important to distinguish the distribution of duration
across rms (DAF) with conventional distribution of duration across contracts. This is
because the conventional distribution has a problem of the oversampling of short price
spells. Since the conventional distribution of durations ignores the role of rms in setting
prices and the panel structure of the economy, it does not directly relate to rms pricing
behaviour. As suggested by Dixon and Kara (2011), we can also generate a distribution
using aggregate Calvo probability if no estimated hazard function is available. These
three distributions (DAF, conventional, Calvo) are shown in the Figure 2-15. It is clear
that the conventional distribution of duration has too large share of 1-month spells,
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Figure 2-15: Comparision of distributions
while the Calvo distribution does not have enough 1-month spells. There is no 12-month
spike in Calvo distribution or the conventional distribution. Furthermore, the Calvo
distribution and conventional distribution both have thin tails in the long term, while
the DAF has a relatively fat tail in the long term.
2.5 Two benchmark pricing models
Here we try to distinguish between di¤erent models of price-setting behaviour by using
the empirical evidence we have found in previous section. This work is inspired by
Eichenbaum, Jaimovich, and Rebelo (2011). In their work, they use their empirical
ndings, which come from the weekly data in frame work of "reference price", to discuss
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the implications for menu costs models and Calvo models22. Similarly, we focus on these
two kinds of model: Calvo (1983) and menu costs model developed by Barro (1972),
and Sheshinski and Weiss (1977). These two models are most popularly embedded in
macroeconomics models, especially in monetary economy.
2.5.1 A common model setup
In line with Wieland et al. (2009), we start by presenting our approach to pricing models
comparison. A general class of dynamic stochastic macroeconomic models is augmented
with a space of common comparable variables, parameters and shocks. Augmenting mod-
els in this manner is a necessary pre-condition for a systematic comparison of particular
model characteristics. We derive comparable objects that may be produced as model
output, such as average frequency of price change, hazard function23, and the DAF.
We assume that a rm uses a linear technology to produce a di¤erentiated good. And
following most literature in this area24, we assume an economy without capital, and leave
the labor as the only input.
yt (q) = At (q)Lt (q) (2.2)
From this equation (2.2) , we dene the following variables. The rm q produce yt (q)
22Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) calibrate a benchmark menu cost model to match the main ve
facts they nd about prices.
23The slope and shape of the hazard function are important questions, because they are related
to such important features of price setting: whether the recently changed prices are more likely to
change again, or is it the case that prices become more likely to change the longer they have remained
unchanged? Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) are two among others
which highlighted the importance of the slope and shape of the hazard function.
24See Golosov and Lucas (2007), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008).
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output in period t. In order to produce this amount of output in period t, the rm need
to employ a quantity of labour as Lt (q). A labour combined technology in period t can
be dened as At (q).
Di¤erentiated goods yt (q) can be used to produce a nal consumption good Yt. We
assume the production function exhibit a CES love of variety over a continuum of di¤er-
entiated goods y that are indexed by q 2 [0; 1] :
Yt =
Z 1
0
yt (q)
 1
 dq
 
 1
:
And we assume the corresponding unit cost function Pt is:
Pt =
Z 1
0
pt (q)
1  dq
 1
1 
:
where pt (q) denotes the nominal price the rm charges in period t: As is standard in this
setup, the demand for the output of rm q is given by
yt (q) =

pt (q)
Pt
 
Yt (2.3)
where yt (q) denotes the quantity demanded of the rms good.
Given aggregate output level Yt, aggregate nominal price index Pt, and the wage rate
for each rm asWt (f), the rm chooses fpt (q) ; yt (q) ; Lt (q)g to maximize prots subject
to equation (2.2,2.3).
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The householdspreferences are dened over a nal composite consumption good Ct,
and leisure 1   Lt, where Lt denotes the time devoted to market employment. House-
holds maximize their expected lifetime utility of consumption, a discounted consump-
tion stream at time t, Et
P1
t=0 
tU (Ct; 1  Lt), where they exhibit a CES love of va-
riety Ct =
hR 1
0
ct (h)
 1
 dz
i 
 1
over a continuum of nal goods c that are indexed by
h 2 [0; 1].For simplicity, we let aggregate consumption is a constant C that determines
the size of the market for the rms good. As is standard in this setup, consumer demand
for good is
ct (h) = C

pt (h)
Pt
 
; (2.4)
where ct (h) denotes the quantity demanded of the rms good in period t, pt (h) denotes
the nominal price the rm charges in period t. Pt denotes the nominal price index the rm
charges in period t, which can be dened as:Pt =
hR 1
0
pt (h)
1  dz
i 1
1 
. The parameter 
governs the price elasticity of demand for the individual goods. And for symmetry, we
have q = h.
For simplicity, we assume that a constant-elasticity demand in the economy, which
implies a constant markup pricing strategy:
Pt =

   1Wt
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Therefore, the real wage in our economy is a constant:
Wt
Pt
=
   1

; (2.5)
where Wt denotes nominal wage rate in the economy at time t. As Nakamura and
Steinsson (2008) argues that, more generally, if the degree of the monetary nonneutrality
is small, variation in Ct will be small and the real wage will be approximately constant.
Assume that the logarithm of technology of the rms labour force follows an AR(1)
process:
log (At (q)) =  log (At 1 (q)) + "t (q) (2.6)
where "t (f)  N (0; 2") is an idiosyncratic technology shock.
Assume that the logarithm of the price level uctuates around a trend:
logPt = + logPt 1 + t (2.7)
where t  N (0; 2).
2.5.2 Calvo price-setting
We assume that prices vary across rms. In every period t some rms can adjust the
price level others cannot. Hence, there is price stickiness. The possibility of changing the
price level is determined at random, i.e. price adjustment is random, and this probability
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does not change over time.
In particular, we denote by  the probability that the price level is unchanged in a
generic period t, while 1   is the probability that the price level changes.
Using equations (2.2),(2.4),and (2.5) and the fact that markets clear C = Y , we can
write real prots as
(pt (q) ;Pt; At (q)) = C

pt (q)
Pt
  
pt (q)
Pt
     1

1
At (q)

(2.8)
When a rm adjusts its price, it maximizes the present discounted value of prots.
Firms are assumed to know the current values of both the current exogenous and endoge-
nous state variables, when making their decision about their current price, and assumed
to satisfy all demand on this price. The state variables of the system are denoted by ,
where t = (pt (q) ; Pt; At (q)). Let the value function of the rms be
Vt (t) = maxfV NC ;V Cg
 
V NCt (t) + (1  )V Ct (t)

(2.9)
where the value function in case of no price change NC is given by
V NCt = max
pt 1(q)
Et
( 1X
j=0
j(pt 1(q);Pt+j; At+j(q))
)
Because each rm adjusts its price with constant probability 1    in any period, the
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value of a rm upon adjustment is give by
V Ct = max
pt 1(q)
Et
( 1X
j=0
j(pt (q) ;Pt+j; At+j (q))
)
(2.10)
where Et denotes the expectations operator conditional on information known at time t.
2.5.3 Menu costs
Instead of assuming that the probability of changing the price level is determined at
random, we assume that the rm must hire an extra M units of labour in order to
change its price, which generate price rigidity25. Again, using equations (2.2),(2.4),and
(2.5) and the fact that markets clear, we can write real prots as
t (q) = C

pt (q)
Pt
  
pt (q)
Pt
     1

1
At (q)

     1

MIt (q) (2.11)
where It (f) is a dummy variable indicates whether the price changes or not.
The rm maximizes prots discounted at a constant rate . The value function of
the rm is given by solution to
V (pt 1 (q) ;Pt; At (f)) = max
pt(q)
[t (q) + EtV (pt (q) ;Pt+1; At+1 (q))] ;
25Klenow and Kryvstov (2008), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) suggest the same simple assumption
on menu cost.
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2.5.4 Solution method
We follow the solution method suggested by Nakamura and Steinsson (2010). Basically,
it is a standard iterative procedure on nite grid of points which is proposed by Tauchen
(1986). We solve for the rms policy function by value function iteration on the grid. We
choose a relative erro tolerance level, ". We obtain the numerical estimates of the value
and policy function when value function has converged, or d < ". Here, d = jjV  V 0jj:V 0
is the update of initial value function V .
As pointed out by Nakamura and Steinsson (2010), the value function algorithm has
a draw back that it is di¢ cult to prove uniqueness. In the menu cost model, there is a
non-convexity because the rm has the option of not changing the price if the cost of doing
so is too high. However, the large idiosyncratic shocks assumed in the model signicantly
reduce the scope for multiplicity, which is in line with Nakamura and Steinsson (2010). It
is important that the large idiosyncratic shocks prevent "su¢ cient synchronization across
rms".
2.5.5 Calibration and simulation
Following Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), we assume linear disutility of labour
and log-utility in consumption. We set annual discount factor as 0.97 as Klenow and
Kryvtsov (2008), consistent with steady state annual real interest rate of 3 per cent,
which also leads to the monthly discount factor as  = 0:971=12. The value of  denes the
markups of prices over marginal cost, or equivalently, the elasticity of demand. Studies
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by Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) and Kimball (1995) suggest a value of  = 11. Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000) use a value of  = 10. Midrigan (2006) uses  = 3 while
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) use  = 4, which they think it imply a markup similar
to the mean markup estimated by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). Golosov and
Lucas (2007) use  = 7. Dixon and Kara (2010) set  = 12. In light of these studies, we
set  = 5. We estimate  = 0:0014 and  = 0:00029 from data on the UK CPI from
the period January 1996 to December 2007, implying the average annual ination rate
is about 1.7 percent.26 We calibrate the rest parameters of the model to match statistics
for price changes, which include the frequency of price change and the fraction of price
changes that are price increases in CPI data from 1996 to 2007. We nd that the implied
rst order autocorrelation in technology is  = 0:7, the idiosyncratic technology shock
" = 0:0425
27. For the menu costs mode, we let the menu costs comparing with whole
economy to be M=C = 0:0119. For the Calvo model, we let the the probability of price
changes be consistent with our empirical nding ! = 0:1855.
We simulate model given the grid for idiosyncratic technology shock "t (q), the grid for
the real price (pt (q) =Pt), autoregressive coe¢ cient in process for technology , standard
deviation of idiosyncratic shocks ", average monthly ination rate , standard deviation
of shocks to price level . The number of time periods to be simulated is set to 300; 000:
And we drop the rst 200 time periods when we start the simulation. Furthermore, we
26Annual ination rate can be calculated as (1 + )12   1.
27These calibrations are quite similar to those in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). In their paper,
 = 0:66, and " = 0:0428:
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create duration data from the simulated price data, and chop o¤ left censored spells to
calculate a Kaplin-Meier estimate of the hazard function of price changes. Afterwards, we
generate the distribution of durations across rms from hazard function of price changes.
Simulation result part1: Calvo model
In this part, we report the result of simulation on Calvo model. We have around 300; 000
nominal price quotes which are generate from our Calvo model. We estimate the fre-
quency of price changes, the fraction of price changes that are increases from the sim-
ulation dataset by using the same formula we used for the empirical analysis, and we
manage to make our estimation close to our previous empirical ndings. The frequency
of price changes in our Calvo-dataset equals 18.17 percent. The fraction of price changes
which are increases is 58.52 percent. The gure2-16 shows the hazard function which
is estimated from a dataset simulated from Calvo model. It is clear that the hazard
function is almost a horizontal line28, which means that the probability of price change
is constant in Calvo model.
The Figure 2-17 describe the distribution of duration across rms implied by Calvo
model. This is consistent with the shape of exponential distribution, just as Dixon and
Kara (2005) point out.
We also generate the graph which shows the evolution of price trajectory, the path
28The main reason for the hazard function for the Calvo case deviates from a completely horizontal line
is that the right censorings will a¤ect the calculation of the empirical hazard function. Theoretically, some
rms with Calvo pricing strategy may keep their price unchanged forever. However, in the simulation,
we must treat the unchanged price spells as right censorings, and this will a¤ect the simulated hazard
function.
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Figure 2-16: Hazard function of price change in Calvo pricing.
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Figure 2-17: Distribution of duration across rms implied by Calvo model
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Figure 2-18: Simulation of price trajectory from Calvo model.
of desired price, and general price level.The Figure 2-18 indicate that the desired price
,which can be measured by the product between general price Pt and inverse of A (f) ;
is the most volatile one. This is to say, due to the idiosyncratic technology shock, the
desired price level are quite exible and volatile. But according to our Calvo model
setup, the fraction ! of rms are not able to change the price. Therefore, the blue line
which shows the actual price is sticky. This phenomenon shows that pass-through from
marginal cost to prices is incomplete. This nding from our simulation is consistent
with those ndings from aggregate time-series data, such as Bils (1987), Rotemberg and
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Figure 2-19: Real price and real cost simulated by Calvo model.
Woodford (1999) and Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde (2005), all of which argue
that prices are less volatile than marginal cost. The green dash line shows the general
price level, is quite smooth and upward sloping.
Additionally, we can look at the behaviour of real price pt(f)
Pt
and real cost 1
At(f)
implied
by Calvo model in Figure 2-19. The real cost changes are far more volatile than the real
price changes.
Simulation result part2: menu costs model
In line with the operation we did in part 1, we also simulate a large micro price dataset
from our benchmark menu costs model. We estimate the frequency of price changes from
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Figure 2-20: Hazard function of price change from menu cost model.
this dataset. The statistics on frequency of price change equal 18.77 percent. And the
fraction of price changes which are increases accounts for 55.5 percent. The implied haz-
ard function from our benchmark menu costs model is shown in Figure 2-20. The hazard
function from menu costs model is quite di¤erent from Calvo model. It is increasing in
rst few periods, and then it is becoming relatively at (after downward sloping by a few
months) with a few spikes. The hazard rate are moving around 0.18 which close to the
frequency of price change in this dataset. This nding is consistent with Nakamura and
Steinsson (2008).
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Figure 2-21: Distribution of duration across rms implied by menu cost model.
Furthermore, we can generate the distribution of duration across rms from the hazard
function implied by menu costs. The most striking result is that the Figure 2-21 is similar
to what we nd in Calvo model. In this micro dataset, the most common price duration
is about 4 or 5 months in length. However, we should notice that, the DAF generated
by menu costs model di¤ers from the DAF generated by Calvo model in skewness and
kurtosis.
Moreover, we generate the paths for desirable price, actual price and price level from
the price dataset simulated from menu costs model. We can identify a key feature of
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Figure 2-22, which is that the blue line is quite likely to change with the red line when
large jumps appear in red line. That is to say, when idiosyncratic technology shock is
large enough, the price setters intend to change their actual price to make it in line with
the desired price. This can also be shown in Figure2-23, which plots the real price and
real cost29 simulated by menu costs model. However, we cannot observe this feature from
Figure 2-18. This is because the Calvo model does not have the channel to connect the
idiosyncratic shock with the timing of price change. However, in menu costs model, the
nominal price is still less volatile than the marginal cost.
2.6 Extension: Multiple-sector model
2.6.1 Multiple Calvo model
As we nd in previous sector, the Calvo model and Menu costs model both fail to replicate
the micro evidences we nd on hazard function and the distribution across rms. The
reason is that both models assume homogeneous structure in price setting. However, our
empirical nding suggests that there is signicant heterogeneity in price setting behav-
iours. As pointed out by Carvalho (2006) and Dixon (2012), the multiple Calvo model
can mimic the heterogeneity in price settings. A la Dixon(2009), a multiple Calvo model
can be dened as MC (!; ) where !k 2 (0; 1)which is the frequency of price change for
29As a we have dened, the real cost equals to the inverse of At (f) :
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Figure 2-22: Actual price trajectory, desired nominal price, and general price level sim-
ulated from menu cost model.
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Figure 2-23: Real price and real cost simulated by menu cost model.
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sector k, and k = 1; : : : ; n and  2 4n 1 is the vector of CPI weights. We can get the
reset price for each sector as :
xkt =
1PF
j=1 (1  !k)j 1 j 1
FX
j=1
(1  !k)j 1 j ipt+j 1
The average price in each sector k is :
pkt =
FX
j=1
(1  !k)j 1 j 1xkt j+1
And the aggregate price level is:
pt =
nX
k=1
kpkt
We solve the multiple Calvo model by using the value function iteration method, and
simulate the model given the price frequency and CPI weight in each of 570 item-level
sectors in our micro data. Actually, we get a downward sloping hazard function, albeit
no annual spikes are found in our model simulation (see Figure 2-24). And we also get
a hump shaped DAF in Figure 2-25, which is consistent with the nding in Dixon and
Tian (2011). The simulation result from multiple Calvo model suggests that adding in
heterogeneity in our pricing model can improve the tness of micro evidence.
95
Figure 2-24: Hazard function from Multiple Calvo model
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Figure 2-25: DAF from Multiple Calvo model
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2.6.2 Multiple-sector menu costs model
If we assume that there are many sectors in the economy, and in each sector a specic
product is produced, facing a specic menu cost. A la multiple Calvo model in previous
subsection, the multiple menu costs model is able to generate a downward sloping hazard
function, which is shown in Figure 2-26. In order for a downward sloping aggregate
hazard function to occur, there must be many rms with a low hazard, and the fraction
of rms with a low hazard must be increasing. The reasoning is analogous to that which
explains a downward sloping aggregate hazard in a model with many types of sectors
with di¤erent Calvo probabilities of adjustment. As the age of a price progresses, the
fraction of rms who have not adjusted is increasingly dominated by those with the lower
hazardimplying a downward sloping aggregate hazard rate. Furthermore, adding rm-
level productivity shocks creates the possibility that unexpected increases in productivity
lead to situations where rms wish to decrease their price, and where the probability of
price adjustment decreases over time even though a rms relative price depreciates with
ination. The DAF for multiple menu costs model can be seen as Figure 2   27: The
DAF generated from multiple menu costs model becomes more close to the empirical
DAF estimated from micro data. Though there is a small hump in the rst 2 months in
our simulation result.
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Figure 2-26: Hazard function generated from Multiple Menu Costs model
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Figure 2-27: DAF generated from Multiple Menu Cost model
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2.7 Conclusion
We propose a unied framework to assess the price rigidity. The frequency, hazard
function, and the distribution across rms are three di¤erent perspectives to look at the
same thing. We prove that these three methods can give the consistent estimates if we
choose the proper treatment on censoring price spells. We also compare the di¤erent
assumption on the right-censoring, and how robust our results are.
Employing the CPI data collected by the ONS, we nd some empirical facts about
price setting from late 1990s to 2007. In CPI micro- data set, price changes are frequent
(about 21% on average) and the frequency of price changes varies a lot between di¤erent
sectors. When we estimate the frequency of price changes excluding the sales from CPI
data, the frequency of price changes becomes much lower.
The aggregate hazard function is downward sloping with large annual spikes. The
downward sloping hazard function cannot be explained by standard time-dependent or
state-dependent model. However, it can be rationalized by a customer relation model
(Vincent, 2012). It is assumed that rms understand that their pricing decisions will
a¤ect their customer base and hence future prots. As the rm maintains prices constant,
it attracts new custmoers and retains its loyal clients. This mechanism may rationalize
the decreasing hazard functions observed empirically. Alternatively, we see the downward
sloping aggregate hazard function as a result from the mixture of heterogeneous price-
setters.
We generate the distribution across rms from the hazard function we estimated
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using non-parametric survival analysis. Comparing with the common used distribution
of duration across contracts, we nd that the DAF (the desired distribution) is much
atter than the distribution across contracts. As argued in Dixon (2012), the DAF is the
proper distribution we should infer to when we assess the price rigidity in the second order
moment, and the Calvo probability itself is not enough to generate the whole picture of
price rigidity.
We solve and simulate two benchmark models, the basic Calvo model and menu costs
model. We let both models to match the empirical ndings in frequency of prices changes
and the proportion of prices increases. However, these two benchmark models cannot
meet the empirical ndings in hazard functions and the implied DAF are di¤erent from
empirical one. Moreover, the two benchmark models have di¤erent implication on the
response of actual price level to the idiosyncratic shocks. All of these results suggest that
we need to be careful about the pricing model set up. And a next generation of pricing
models is needed if we want the macro models to meet the micro evidences. We solve
and simulate a multiple-sector Calvo model and a multiple-sector menu costs model. The
results suggest that adding heterogeneity to price-setting model can improve its tness
on micro evidence. As shown in Dixon and Kara (2010), allowing for a distribution of
durations can take us a long way to solving the puzzle of ination persistence. In other
words, an explicit modeling of the distribution of durations can help the DSGE model
to match macro data.
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Chapter 3
What we can learn from the average
monthly frequency of price-changes
in CPI data: an application to the
UK CPI micro data.
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, there have been many studies using comprehensive micro-data on pricing.
In the Euro area, there has been the ination persistence network (IPN ) consisting of
national studies of the CPI and PPI micro data1, which are summarized in Dhyne et al
1See Beaudry et al (2007) and Alvarez and Hernando (2006) for France and Spain inter alia.
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(2006). In the US there have been similar studies: Bils and Klenow (2004), Klenow and
Krytsov (2008), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008)2. One common focus of these studies
has been the statistic of the proportion of prices changing per month (this can either be
an average over several months, or a monthly statistic). This statistic can be presented
in several ways, depending on the level of disaggregation and the treatment of temporary
sales and so on. In this chapter, we seek to analyze what this statistic implies for the
behavior of rms (or more accurately price-setters) in the economy. Each period rms
set prices: they may either choose to leave the price unchanged or to change it. The
proportion of rms resetting price corresponds to the proportion of prices changing (for
simplicity we take a 1-1 correspondence between rms and prices). The prices of some
product types change frequently (e.g. gasoline, tomatoes) while some very infrequently.
We can think of the CPI dataset as a panel of observations, each cross-section corre-
sponding to the prices set by "rms" at that date. The cross-sectional mean completed
price spell can be seen as capturing the mean behavior of the price-setters, which repre-
sents the "structure" of the economy in this respect (i.e. the average behavior of the rms
in the economy). For a given frequency of price change, what can we infer about the
behavior of the rms? In this paper we are able to derive a lower bound (and an upper
bound) for the mean length of price-spells across rms, interpreted as the cross-sectional
mean completed price-spell. The cross-sectional distribution is needed if we are to model
price-setting as a Taylor process. We then use the UK CPI data for the period 1996-
2See Bunn and Ellis (2009) for the UK and Baharad and Eden (2004) for Israel.
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2007 and consider frequency data at three di¤erent levels of disaggregation: the 11 sector
COICOP, the 67 sector COICOP and the highest possible level of disaggregation at 570
items, to see how the actual data on price-spell durations compares to the theoretical
minimum. We nd that the actual mean estimated from the CPI is 10.9 months, which
is 62-90% higher than the theoretical minima generated from the frequency data. This
is not surprising, in Proposition 1 we nd that the theoretical minimum consistent with
a given frequency is only attained if all price-spells have the same or almost the same
duration, whilst the actual distribution contains a lot of heterogeneity in durations which
implies a longer cross-sectional mean.
We also interpret the frequency data under the hypothesis that within the sector the
frequency is generated by a Calvo distribution, as has been assumed in applied work by
Dixon and Kara (2010, 2011). We look at this in two ways. First, we aggregate over
all sectors to derive the aggregate distribution under this assumption: thus we have the
distribution of durations in each sector and for each duration we aggregate over sectors
using the sectoral CPI weights. We can then compare this to the "true" distribution
derived from the estimated hazard function.
 The aggregate distribution derived under the Calvo hypothesis at the sectoral level
has a similar mean and median to the true distribution, with the mean increasing
with the level of disaggregation. For example, the 570 model yields a mean of 10.8
and median of 7.8 months, whilst the true values are 10.9 and 7.8 respectively.
 However, the implied Calvo distributions di¤er from the true distribution in signif-
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icant ways: (i) there is a 12 month spike in the true distribution absent from the
Calvo distributions, (ii) the proportion of short price-spells (1-3 months) is less in
the Calvo than in the true distribution.
We also examine whether the Calvo is a good t in each of the 11 COICOP sectors.
Since the data set is large, even small deviations of the actual distribution from the
hypothetical Calvo distribution cause the Calvo null to be rejected under the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, which is indeed the case. However, whilst in some sectors the hypothesized
Calvo distribution looks completely di¤erent (for example in Health which has a very
large 12 month spike), in others the Calvo looks more similar (Transportation). There
is clearly a variety of patterns across sectors3 when we compare the true distributions
within the 11 COICOP sectors.
Whilst the Calvo distributional hypothesis might not provide a good statistical t
in terms of the aggregate or sectoral distributions, does this matter in terms of how the
economy behaves? Since the Calvo hypothesis yields a mean and median close to the true
distribution, perhaps the di¤erences will not result in di¤erent behavior of the economy in
terms of impulse response functions. We explore this in the context of two macro models:
a simple Quantity Theory model and the Smets and Wouters (2003) Euro area model.
The pricing models used are the Generalized Taylor and Calvo as in Dixon and Le Bihan
(2012), which are both consistent with any micro distributions of durations and can be
calibrated to the true data and the data under the Calvo distributional hypothesis. What
3This heterogeneity across sectors was also found in the French data by Fougere et al (2007).
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we nd is that the impulse response functions for output and ination are very similar
when we use the true distribution and hypothetical Calvo distribution at the di¤erent
levels of disaggregation for both the generalized Taylor and Generalized Calvo. In the
Smets-Wouters model, the IRFs are indeed almost identical. This indicates that if we
are interested in modelling macroeconomic properties of an economy, using the sectoral
frequency data under the Calvo distributional hypothesis might be a useful shortcut and
alternative to estimating the distribution using the hazard function. Indeed, where the
actual hazard is not available or not estimated reliably, we can be condent that the use
of sectoral frequencies with the Calvo distributional hypothesis can be a good working
approximation.
The structure of the chapter is follows. In section 2, we give a theoretical description
of the steady state distributions of durations. In section 3, we derive an upper and
lower bound for the mean duration of price-spells averaged across rms. We show an
application to the UK CPI data in section 4. In section 5, we simulate a quantitative
theory model and a Smets-Wouters model, both with Generalized Taylor and Generalized
Calvo price-setting respectively. We conclude in sector 6.
3.2 Steady state distributions of durations.
The statistical framework for understanding the CPI microdata is outlined in detail by
Dixon (2012), so in this paper we just summarize in a less technical manner the key
properties needed for this paper.
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There is a continuum of price-setting rms f 2 [0; 1] ; time is discrete4 and innite
t 2 Z+ = f0; 1; 2:::1g : The price set by rm f at time t is pft. A price spell
is a duration, a sequence of consecutive periods that have the same price. For every
ft; fg  [0; 1]Z+ we can assign an integer d(t; f) which is the duration of the price-spell
to which pft belongs5. The distribution of price-spell durations is simply the proportions
of all durations having length i = 1:::F : d =

di
	F
i=1
2 F 1. We assume a steady-
state, so that the distribution of durations of new price-spells is the same for each new
cohort of price-spells. This means that the distribution of price-spells is exactly the
same as the distribution of new price spells at any period.
Whilst the distribution of durations d 2 F 1 is one way of looking at the micro-
data, it ignores the panel structure of the data. Each row of the panel is a trajectory of
prices corresponding to a particular rm (or more accurately product sold at an outlet).
Each column is a cross-section of all of the prices set by rms at a point in time. The
cross-sectional distribution of completed price-spell durations is  2 F 1. In e¤ect, we
take a representative t, and for each rm we see the completed price-spell duration at
that time d(f; t):
The proportion of rms re-setting price each month is denoted as h : in the UK this is
equal to 21%: We dene the mean duration6 of price-spells across the Panel as a whole
4Typically, CPI data are collected on a monthly basis, the price observations being obtained in the
rst two weeks of the calendar month.
5Note that in assigning an integer to a duration, we start with 1 by convention: it would be equally
valid to start with 0. With our convention, a new price-spell is 1 month old, rather than becoming 1
on completion of the rst month.
6Again, this way of dening the mean is consistent with our convention of assigning the integer 1 to
the rst time period. Had we instead assigned a 0 to this value, then we would have the expression
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as
d
 
d

=
FX
i=1
idi
and cross-sectional mean (across rms) as
T () =
FX
i=1
ii (3.1)
Note that the cross sectional mean in general be larger than the mean duration T  d:
this is because in cross-section you have length-biased sampling, since the probability of
a price-spell being observed in cross-section is proportional to its duration. Indeed, the
two can be equal ( T = d) if and only if F = dF = 1; so that all price-spells are F
months long and there is no heterogeneity to generate a length bias.
From Dixon (2012), we know that7:
h = d 1 (3.2)
=
FX
i=1
i
i
(3.3)
That is, the proportion of rms resetting price is equal to the reciprocal of the mean
duration d. Furthermore, the proportion of rms resetting price is related to the cross-
sectional distribution by equation (3:3) : In steady-state, a proportion i 1 of the i
PF
i=1(i   1)i (as we do with human ages). An equally acceptable measure is to take the midpoint
and have
PF
i=1(i   0:5)i We can move between these denitions simply by adding or subtracting a
constant.
7In continuous time, we have d =   1
log(1 h) ; which allows for the price to change more than once per
period. Again, we are using a discrete time setting in which durations are integer valued.
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i duration rms reset their price. The aggregate proportion is simply the sum over the
durations i = 1:::F .
3.3 The average duration across rms consistent with
h¯.
Now, for a given frequency h there are many possible distributions across rms (DAF)
 2 F 1 consistent with identity (3:3) and each distribution results in a corresponding
mean across rms T (): We can dene the mapping H
 
h

: [0; 1]! F 1
H
 
h

=
(
 2 F 1 :
FX
i=1
i
i
= h
)
H
 
h

is the set of all DAFs which are consistent with a given mean duration of price-
spells d expressed in terms of the corresponding proportion of rms resetting prices h.
Clearly, since the maximum duration is F , we have h  F 1 so that H is non-empty.
Since H
 
h

is dened by a linear restriction on the sector shares , H
 
h
  F 2 and
is closed and bounded. We can then ask what is the minimum (maximum) T consistent
with a given d. Since H
 
h

is non-empty, closed and bounded, with T () continuous,
both a maximum and a minimum will exist. Turning to the minimization problem rst:
we have:
min T () s:t:  2 H  h (3.4)
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Proposition 1 Let min 2 F 1 solve (3:4) to give the shortest average contract length
Tmin.
(a) No more than two sectors i have values greater than zero
(b) If there are two sectors i > 0, j > 0 then will be consecutive integers
(ji  jj = 1).
(c) There is one solution i¤ h 1 = k 2 Z+. In this case, k = 1.
(d) The minimum is Tmin = h 1 = d.
We can also ask what is the maximum average contract length consistent with a
proportion of re-setters h:
max T () s:t:  2 H  h (3.5)
Proposition 2 Let max 2 F 1 solve (3:5). Given the longest contract duration F ,
the distribution of contracts that maximizes the average length of contract subject
to a given proportion h of rms resetting price
maxF =
F
F   1
 
1  h
max1 =
F
F   1
h  1
F   1
with maxi = 0 for i = 2:::F   1: The maximum average contract length is
Tmax = F
 
1  h+ 1
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To understand Propositions 1 and 28, we just need to think of what is generating
the mean duration d and the proportion of rms changing price each period h. There
is the unit interval of rms, divided into proportions with di¤erent price-spell durations
i = 1:::F . Firms with price-spell lengths i will set prices once every i 1 periods: the
longer the price-spell, the more infrequently the rm will reset price. Hence, we can
have the same proportion of rms re-setting price (and hence same mean duration) and
increase the mean duration across rms by more longer price-spells. The maximum Tmax
is reached when we have as many F period contracts as possible, consistent with h. In
e¤ect, this means we have a mix of 1 period and F period price-spells. The existence of a
maximum relies on us assuming an upper bound F : clearly, as F !1, Tmax !1. The
minimum occurs when all rms have similar price-spells: if d happens to be an integer,
then all price-spells have that length and the two distributions are the same: d = .
This section derives the lower and upper bound for the mean length of price spells.
This is an important issue given many previous studies derive the distribution of price
spells from sectoral or item level frequencies of price changes, using the convention method
(e.g. average length of price spells=1/average frequency of price change). We argue that
the convention method e¤ectively gives the lower bound for the mean length of price
spells at either sectoral or item level. We manage to derive the upper bound for the
mean length of price spells, which showing the theoretical maximum average length of
price spells.
8The proofs of Proposition 1 and 2 are illustrated in Dixon (2012).
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3.4 An application to the UK CPI micro data9.
In this section, we take the frequency data from the UK and apply the two propositions
to derive the implied upper and lower bounds for the cross-sectional mean duration. We
then estimate the actual distribution and the corresponding mean and how it compares
to the theoretical distributions that yield the maximum and minimum mean durations
across-rms. Our research data set is the locally collected CPI price microdata covering
the period from January 1996 to December 2007. The detailed description of our data
can be found in the Appendix. The period covered corresponds to the Great Moderation
period when the frequencies would have been stationary. We also want to see how the
level of disaggregation a¤ects the results. For the UK, we have the following levels of
disaggregation available from the ONS:
 11 COICOP categories
 67 disaggregated COICOP categories.
 570 items.
Each of these disaggregations represents exactly the same data. To get an idea
of the level of aggregation, we can depict the broad 11 COICOP categories (excluding
education which is not included in the VML dataset) in Table 3.1. For example, there
9This work contains statistical data from ONS which is Crown copyright and reproduced
with the permission of the controller of HMSO and Queens Printer for Scotland. The use
of the ONS statistical data in this work does not imply the endorsement of the ONS in
relation to the interpretation or analysis of the statistical data. This work uses research
datasets which may not exactly reproduce National Statistics aggregates
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is the category "food and non-alcoholic beverages" which represents 17.6% of the CPI
weight in the subsample available in the dataset. The second level of disaggregation
subdivides these into a total of 67 COICOP subcategories. For example, within ""food
and non-alcoholic beverages" there are 11 subcategories: 2 for drinks (tea, co¤ee and
cocoa; mineral water, soft drinks and juices) and 9 for food (such as meat, sh, fruit).
The lowest level of disaggregation is the item level. An item is a particular product or
service on which the price observation is made. For example: canned sweet corn (198g-
340g); co¤ee - take-away; fresh lettuce (iceberg). The 570 items we include are all of the
items which were included throughout the sample period - it excludes old items which
were either discontinued or new items introduced in this period. These items represent
over 66.4% of the total CPI.
Firstly, we present in Table 3.1 and for each category, we have the frequency data,
which gives the proportion of items changing price in a given month10. The items are
weighted by the appropriate CPI weight. The data are represented in Table 3.1.
In the rst column of Table 3.1 is the COICOP sector, in the second the CPI weight
for the sector, normalized so that they add up to 100 (since Education is excluded) and
the third is the frequency of price change. In the fourth we have the minimum average
duration (MAD) in that sector from Proposition 1, and in the fth the maximum from
Proposition 2 based on the assumption that the longest price-spell is 44 months.
10In a given month, they look at all the prices of items at an outlet and compare them, with the price
the previous month. The gure excludes items for which there was no observation the month before
(e.g. it is the rst price observation of the item at the outlet).
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COICOP Category. CPI adj. Freq Min. Max
Transport 10.4 36 2.8 29.2
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 7.1 27.6 3.6 32.9
Clothing and Footwear 9.3 27.2 3.7 33
Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages 17.6 26 3.8 33.6
Furniture and Home Maintenance 11.3 22.7 4.4 35
Communications 0.2 22.5 4.4 35.1
Recreation and Culture 9.9 20 5 36.2
Housing and Utilities 8.3 13.7 7.3 39
Miscellaneous Goods and Services 6.5 12.7 7.9 39.4
Restaurants and Hotels 17.5 10.5 9.5 40.4
Health 1.9 10.4 9.6 40.4
Table 3.1: COICOP 11 sectoral frequencies
"Freq" denotes the frequencies of prices changes, which are reported in percent per
month. "CPI adj." denotes the adjusted CPI expenditure weight of the CPI sectors after
excluding the Education sector. "Min." denotes the minimum average duration. "Max"
denotes the maximum average duration
We next generate the cross-sectional distribution in the whole economy correspond-
ing to the minimum average duration consistent with the observed frequencies. From
Proposition 1, in each sector we will have one or two durations with a non-zero share.
In recreation and culture, since 20% of prices change per month, there are just 5 month
price-spells. In food and non-alcoholic beverages there will be a mixture of 20% 3 month
and 80% 4 month price-spells. The shortest durations are 2 months (in transport) and
the longest 10 months (in health). For each duration, we can then add up across the 11
sectors to get the weighted cross-sectional distribution. This is depicted in Figure 3-1:
We estimate the actual cross-sectional distribution using the hazard functions which
are already obtained in the Chapter 2. We can see that the distributions are completely
di¤erent, although derived from exactly the same data. The "minimum duration" dis-
tribution has no 1 month, 6 month, 11 month or 12 month durations; the most common
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Figure 3-1: Actual DAF vs. Minimum Duration 11 COICOP
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durations are 4 months (32% ), then followed by the 3 months (16%) and 5 months
(14%). Among the rest, we nd that the share of distribution coincidently according
with the length of duration, such as 10 months (10%) and 9 months (9%), 8 months (8%),
7 months (7%), 2 months (2%). In contrast, the "true" distribution is much atter with
a long tale (which we have truncated at 24 months). The most common duration is
1 month (10.3%) closely followed by 2 months (8.5%). There is an annual spike at 12
months (4%). Whilst the longer durations tend it have lower shares the cross-sectional
distribution is non-monotonic. The maximum duration distribution is to have a mix
of one month and the maximum duration (44 months). As a rst approximation, the
share of the one month durations in each sector is a little less than the frequency. This
is clearly very di¤erent from the actual distribution.
We can now see what the e¤ect of further disaggregation is: we perform the same
procedure for the COICOP 67 and the 570 item level. These are all depicted in Figure
3-2, along with the COICOP 11 and the true distribution.
These are "minimum duration" distributions generated by di¤ering levels of disag-
gregation. They share some common features when compared to the true distribution:
they all put too little weight on month 1, month 12, and after. They all put too much
weight on months 3-5 and months 9 and 10. However, they are also quite di¤erent.
The level of disaggregation clearly matters when constructing a possible cross-sectional
distribution. We can see this from the mean and median durations in Table 3.2:
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Figure 3-2: Actual DAF vs. Minimum Durations
Mean DAF Median DAF
True 10.9 7.8
11_min 5.5 4
67_min 6.1 4.5
570_min 6.7 5.8
Table 3.2: The minimum mean and median duration across rms comparison
"True" denotes the actual cross-sectional distribution implied by hazard function,
"11_min", "67_min", and "570_min" denote the cross-sectional distributions derived
from the "minimum method" at di¤erent disaggregation level, corresponding to 11
COICOP categories,67 disaggregated COICOP categories,and 570 items respectively.
"Mean DAF" and "Median DAF" denote the mean and median length of duration
across rms, and both of them are in unit of month.
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It is quite clear that the mean and median length in all these "minimum duration"
distributions are far too short, reecting the fact that the minimum duration distributions
put a large weight on the shorter distributions and do not have a long fat tail as in the
data. In fact, the minimum durations are just over half the actual mean duration.
3.4.1 Calvo Distributions.
Clearly, the "minimum duration" distributions corresponding to Proposition 1 do not look
at all like the true distribution. In this section we look at the distribution generated by
the hypothesis that the sectoral frequencies are generated by a Calvo distribution. Again,
as in the previous section, we are looking at exactly the same data, just at di¤erent levels
of aggregation. Within each sector k = 1:::N , we observe a frequency of hk. As shown
in Dixon and Kara (2006), this corresponds to the cross-sectional distribution for that
sector k = fikg1i=1 where:
ki = i:h
2
k(1  hk)i 1 (3.6)
Each sector has a CPI weight ck. We can then aggregate across the N sectors using
the CPI weights to get the share of each duration across all sectors  = fig1i=1 where:
i =
NX
k=1
ckki (3.7)
119
The mean duration of the Calvo distribution at the sectoral level is11:
TCk = 2h
 1
k   1: (3.8)
The mean of the aggregate distribution is thus:
T =
NX
k=1
ck T
C
k
This is the method used in Dixon and Kara (2010, 2011) for generating the Bils-Klenow
distribution based on the Bils Klenow (2004) appendix dataset of 350 sectoral frequencies
for the US.
It is important to note that by assuming a Calvo distribution, we are not assuming
a Calvo pricing model within each sector. We are simply describing the distribution of
price-spell durations in each sector generated by a constant hazard rate that is equal to
the sectoral frequency. This is purely descriptive of the distribution. It is perfectly
compatible with a Taylor model, where within each sector the length of the price-spells
is known ex ante. What we are doing in e¤ect in constructing  = fig1i=1 using (3:7):
that means we take out all of the i duration spells from each sector k and put them
together into a duration sector i, which includes all of the price-spells of length i in
the economy. The key di¤erence between the Calvo and Taylor pricing frameworks is
that under Taylor the rms know the length of the price-spell when they set the price,
11Dixon and Kara (2006), Theorem 1.
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Figure 3-3: Calvo distributions at di¤erent levels of aggregation vs. Actual DAF.
whereas in the Calvo they do not.
In Figure 3-3, we represent the Calvo distributions at di¤erent levels of aggregation:
the one sector "aggregate Calvo" (AC) distribution based on the mean UK frequency of
0.2140; the 11 sector COICOP, the 67 sector COICOP and the 570 item level. We have
truncated the theoretical Calvo distributions at 44 months.
The rst observation is that the level of aggregation inuences the shape of the ag-
gregate distribution. The distributions all have a "hump" shape12, which peaks at 2
12It worth of notice that we focus on distribution of durations across rms (DAF) instead of distribution
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months (COICOP 67 and Item 570), 3 months (COICOP 11), and 4 months(AC). They
all have far too few one-month shares and of course miss the 12 month spike. However,
from month 8, COICOP 67 and Item 570 both track the true distribution fairly well
(except for month 12). AC and COICOP 11 both overestimate the share of durations
between 3 months and 16 months, and they underestimate the share of durations longer
than 16 months. However, COICOP 11 is relatively closer to the true distribution than
AC. The above results suggest that as sector level become more disaggregated, the im-
plied Calvo distributions converge to the true distribution. If we look at the Item 570
Calvo distribution, the most disaggregated one we have, this peaks at month 2 and is
the only Calvo distribution to be roughly close to (a little less than) the true proportion
of 1 months. Furthermore, the Calvo distribution generated by Item 570 is quite similar
from the months 2 onwards, only missing the 12 months spike. The UK distribution has
a fatter tail, but the Calvo tails are certainly quite substantial. Essentially, the Calvo
distributions put too much weight on the shorter months (1-7) and hence put less weight
on the remaining durations.13
The means and medians of the di¤erent Calvo distributions are listed in Table 3.3.
Here we can see that as the category becomes more disaggregated, the mean and median
of Calvo distributions become closer to the true distribution. Indeed, the Calvo distrib-
of durations across contracts. This is equivalent to a length biased sampling. As pointed out by Dixon
(2012), the so called Calvo distribution is purely descriptive of the distribution. We nd a hump shaped
distribution in monthly data. This is just an empirical nding. And we do not assume a Calvo pricing
model within each sector or item.
13We then look at the sectoral data to see what the sectoral distributions actually look like. Most
of these do not t the Calvo implied distribution. We use a Komogorov-Smirnov test to conrm this
nding. See appendix 2 for detail.
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Mean DAF Median DAF
True 10.9 7.8
11_Calvo 9.1 6.8
67_Calvo 10.5 7.2
570_Calvo 10.8 7.8
AC 8.3 6.5
Table 3.3: Mean and median durations of Calvo distributions
"True" denotes the actual cross-sectional distribution implied by hazard function,
"AC","11_Calvo", "67_Calvo", and "570_Calvo" denote the cross-sectional
distributions derived from the "Calvo distribution" at di¤erent aggregate level,
corresponding to one aggregate sector, 11 COICOP categories,67 disaggregated
COICOP categories,and 570 items respectively. "Mean DAF" and "Median DAF"
denote the mean and median length of duration across rms, and both of them are in
unit of month.
ution generated by Item 570 almost has the same mean and median value as what we get
from the True distribution. If we compare the means of the Calvo distributions, these
are linked to the distributions in Table 3.2, since the mean of the minimum duration
distribution is
Tmin =
NX
k=1
ckh
 1
k
which yields the theoretical relation TC = 2: Tmin   1. Hence the Calvo means are
similar to the actual mean, whilst the theoretical minimum is just over half. No such
exact relation holds for the medians. If we look at Tables 2 and 3, we can see that
the Calvo means are less than the theoretical means. This is because we have truncated
the Calvo distributions at 44 months: if we extend this then the mean will approach its
theoretical value. Truncation reduces the mean quite signicantly, since the long tail
of the Calvo distribution will be allocated to the 44th month: whilst the shares of these
longer durations are small, they are long and so a¤ect the mean.
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Whilst the Calvo assumption gives us a mean that is about right, it di¤ers considerably
from the true distribution. There are not enough one-period price-spells: in the data,
there are a lot of products that have perfectly exible prices that change almost every
month (petrol, vegetables etc.) Hence the rst period hazard rate needs to be higher
than in the standard Calvo model. Second there are too many 3-8 month spells. This
implies that the hazard needs to be lower for these months. Then of course there is a 12
month peak.
We can also look at the distributions within each of the 11 COICOP sectors. This
we do in Appendix B. There is considerable heterogeneity in the sectoral distributions.
Whilst most have a 12 month peak, there are several sectors which have little if any 12
month peak in the DAF or hazard: these latter include Food and non-alcoholic beverages,
alcoholic beverages, clothing and footwear, communication. Also, there are sectors
which have peaks other than 12 months which are important: housing and utilities has
peaks every 4 months, communications at 5-6, 11 and 18 months. We compare each
sectoral distribution with the corresponding Calvo distribution. Since we have such a
large data set, the formal Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the null hypothesis that the
two distributions are the same in all of the 11 sectors. We also measure the degree of
"overlap" of the two distributions for each sector. That is, the extent to which the two
distributions allocate the same mass to the same values: it is the sum of the absolute
deviations for each value (in this case number of months) relative to the total mass.
A value of 1 means that there is no overlap at all: 0 that they are identical. In the
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case of the distributions, the di¤erence is as low as 0.18 for Alcoholic beverages, 0.20 for
restaurants & hotels, and 0.23 for transportation. For the rest it is over 0.30 peaking
at 0.58 for Health. Given that there must be some overlap here (all of the values for
both distributions are strictly positive for months 1-44), these gures indicate a wide
divergence in most sectors. In conclusion, we can say that the Calvo distribution is not
a good description of the data either at the aggregate level or the COICOP 11 level.
3.5 The Simulation of di¤erent pricing models.
We nd that we can use the sectoral frequencies to generate the corresponding hypo-
thetical Calvo distributions. For the UK data at least, we nd that at high levels of
disaggregation, the resultant hypothetical aggregate distribution matches the true dis-
tribution quite well in terms of both the mean and the median. There are signicant
di¤erences, most notably the hypothetical distribution has no 12 month spike and too
few exible prices. Since the mean and median are close, do the di¤erences matter at
the aggregate level? If we simulate a DSGE macro model using the hypothetical Calvo
distribution, will it yield a good approximation to the simulations using the true distrib-
ution found in the UK data? If the answer is "yes", then it implies that the absence of
the 12 month spike and too few exible prices does not matter from the perspective of
the macroeconomic properties of the DSGE model. This validates the approach taken
in Dixon and Kara (2010,2011) and Kara (2011) which used the hypothetical Calvo dis-
tribution derived from the Bils-Klenow table of sectoral frequencies in order to calibrate
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their US pricing models.
We will perform our simulations using two DSGE models: a simple Quantity theory
model (QT) and the Smets and Wouters (2003) (SW) model. We will look at two pricing
models in both of these cases: the Generalized Taylor (GT) and Generalized Calvo (GC)
model as in Dixon and Le Bihan (2012).
3.5.1 Price setting.
There are two general time-dependent models which are capable of reecting the un-
derlying distribution of data found in the micro-data: the Generalized Taylor (GT) and
Generalized Calvo (GC) models The key di¤erence between the models is that in the
GT the rms know how long the price spell will last when they set the price, and so
each duration of price-spell will have a di¤erent reset price. In the GC, in contrast,
the rms do not know how long the price spell will last and have a distribution over
possible price-spells durations. All rms have the same distribution and hence there
is only one reset price every period as in the simple Calvo model. In the Generalized
Taylor Economy (GT ) there are N sectors, i = 1; :::; N: In sector i there are i period
contracts: each period a cohort of i 1 of the rms in the sector sets a new price (or
wage). If we think of the economy as a continuum of rms, we can describe the GT as
a vector of sector shares: i is the proportion of rms that have price-spells of length i.
If the longest observed price-spell is F , then we have
PF
i=1 i = 1 and  2 F 1 is the
F -vector of shares  = figFi=1. We can think of the "sectors" as "duration sectors":
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we can classify the economy by the length of price-spells. The essence of the Taylor
model is that when they set the price, the rm knows exactly how long its price is going
to last. The simple Taylor economy is a special case where there is only one length of
price-spell (e.g. 2 = 1 is a simple Taylor "2 quarters" economy). The GTE is based
on the cross-sectional distribution of completed spell lengths: hence it can also be called
the distribution across rms (DAF ) in this context.
The log-linearised equation for the aggregate price pt is a weighted average of the
sectoral prices pit, where the weights are i :
pt =
FX
i=1
ipit (3.9)
In each sector i, a proportion i 1 of the i rms reset their price at each date. Assuming
imperfect competition and standard demand curve, the optimal reset price in sector i;
xit is given by the rst-order condition of an intertemporal prot-maximisation program
under the constraint implied by price rigidity. The log-linearised equation for the reset
price, as in the standard Taylor set-up, is then given by :
xit =
 
1Pi 1
k=0 
k
!
i 1X
k=0
kEtp

t+k (3.10)
where  is a discount factor, Et is the expectation operator conditional on information
available at date t , and pt+k is the optimal ex price at time t+k. The reset price is thus
an average over the optimal ex prices for the duration of the contract (or price-spell).
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The formula for the optimal ex price will depend on the model: clearly, it is a markup on
marginal cost. We will specify the exact log-linearised equation for the optimal ex-price
when we specify the exact macroeconomic model we use.
The sectoral price is simply the average over the i cohorts in the sector:
pit =
1
i
i 1X
k=0
xit k (3.11)
In each period, a proportion h of rms reset their prices in this economy: proportion
 1 of sector i which is of size i.
h =
FX
i=1
i
i
In the GC, rms have a common set of duration-dependent reset probabilities: the prob-
ability of resetting price i periods after you last reset the price is given by hi. This is
a time-dependent model, and the prole of reset probabilities is h = fhigFi=1. Clearly,
if F is the longest price-spell we have hF = 1 and hi 2 [0; 1) for i = 1:::F   1. Again,
the duration data can be represented by the hazard function. Estimated hazard function
can then be used to calibrate h. Since any distribution of durations can be represented
by the appropriate hazard function, we can choose the GCE to exactly t micro-data.
In economic terms, the di¤erence between the Calvo approach and the Taylor ap-
proach is that when the rm sets its price, it does not know how long its price is going
to last. Rather, it has a survivor function S(i) which gives the probability that its price
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will last at up to i periods. The survivor function in discrete time is14:
S(1) = 1 (3.12)
S(i) =
i 1Y
j=1
(1  hj) i = 2; :::; F
Thus, when they set the price in period t, the rms know that they will last one period
with certainty, at least 2 periods with probability S(2) and so on. The Calvo model is
a special case where the hazard is constant hi = h, S(i) = (1   h)i 1 and F = 1. Of
course, in any actual data set, F is nite.
In the GC model the reset price is common across all rms that reset their price. The
optimal reset price, in the same monopolistic competition set-up as mentioned above, is
given in log-linearised form by:
xt =
1PF
i=1 S(i)
i 1
FX
i=1
S(i)i 1Etpt+i 1 (3.13)
The evolution of the aggregate price-level is given by:
pt =
FX
i=1
S(i)xt i+1 (3.14)
That is, the current price level is constituted by the surviving reset prices of the present
14Note that the discrete time survivor function e¤ectively assumes that all "failures" occur at the end
of the period (or the start of the next period): this corresponds to the pricing models where the price is
set for a whole period and can only change at the transition from one period to the next.
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and last F periods.
3.5.2 A simple quantity theory model with price-setting.
We will rst examine the GC and GT models of prices in a quantity theory model with
labour as the only input of production. This model has the great advantage of being very
simple, because almost all its dynamic properties are generated by the pricing models
alone. DSGE models like the SW model in contrast are quite complicated with dynamic
properties emerging from the interaction of pricing with many other features of the model.
The model we present is in its log-linearised version (see Ascari 2003, Dixon and Kara
2005 for the derivation from macroeconomic foundation).
To model the demand side, we use the Quantity Theory:
yt = mt   pt
where (pt; yt) are aggregate price and output and mt the money supply. We model the
monetary growth process as an autoregressive process of order one AR (1) :
mt = mt 1 + "t
"t = "t 1 + t
where t is a white noise error term (e¤ectively a monetary growth shock). Following
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CEE we set  = 0:5:
The optimal exible price pt at period t in all sectors is given by:
pt = pt + yt (3.15)
The key parameter  captures the sensitivity of the exible price to output15. As discussed
in Dixon and Kara (2010), there are a range of calibrated and estimated values for :
for illustrative purposes, we use the "moderate" case of  = 0:1 as in Mankiw and Reis
(2002). As discussed in Ascari (2003) and Edge (2002), the value of  can be interpreted
as resulting from either wage or price-setting.
In Figure 3-4 and Figure 3-5, we see the IRFs for the QT model responding to a
monetary 1% monetary growth shock. As we can see, the IRFs look similar in shape for
both the GC and GT: for both output and ination. There are four IRFs reecting the
distributions generated from the estimated ("true") UK distribution, and the three Calvo
distributions derived from the sectoral frequencies at di¤erent levels of aggregation. The
results are striking. We can summarize them in a few points:
(a) the IRFs from the four distributions are similar, with the "true" IRF lying in the
middle.
(b) the 570 item Calvo has the largest and most persistent e¤ect on output, followed
by the 67 COICOP Calvo, then the "true" and the 11 COICOP Calvo showing the least
15This can be due to increasing marginal cost and/or an upward sloping supply curve for labour. See
for example Walsh (2003, chapter 5) and Woodford (2003, chapter 3).
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Figure 3-4: IRF of money growth shock in Quantity Theory model for GTE price-setting.
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Figure 3-5: IRF of money growth shock in Quantity Theory model for GCE price-setting.
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GTE GCE
True
-11C
True
-67C
True
-570C
True
-11C
True
-67C
True
-570C
AD in
output
9.12% 8.73% 21.82% 4.34% 14.41% 21.42%
AD in
ination
9.93% 5.36% 11.87% 9.01% 7.99% 10.49%
Table 3.4: The di¤erence in IRF from QT model
e¤ect.
(c) for ination, the 11COICOP has the biggest immediate e¤ect, while it dies out
relatively faster than the other cases. The 570 item Calvo has the smallest immediate
e¤ect, but it has the most persistent e¤ect. The "true" and 67 COICOP Calvo lie in
those two.
(d) the GT has a hump shaped reaction function for ination, the GC does not. This
is consistent with the stylized facts that the biggest e¤ect of monetary policy is not on
impact but after four quarters.
In order to quantify di¤erences between the IRFs, we dene the point-by-point ab-
solute di¤erence as a percentage of the mean "true" IRF i =
jIRFtrue IRFcalvoj
mean(IRFture)
 100%:
Summing these di¤erences over the rst 20Q i (i = 1;    ; 20) and dividing by 20, we
can get the average relative di¤erence (AD), which is shown in the table 3.4.
Here we can see that with the GT model, the IRF generated by the COICOP 67
frequencies is the one most close to those generated from "true" distribution. However,
in the GC model, the results are kind of mix. For the IRF in output, the COICOP 11 is
the one has the smallest average di¤erence. While for the IRF in ination, the COICOP
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67s performance is the best.
3.5.3 A DSGE model: Smets and Wouters (2003)
In this section, we use the Smets and Wouters (2003) model of the euro area commonly
employed for monetary policy analysis. The SW model is much more complicated than
the simple QT model we have just used: there are many sources of dynamics other than
prices and wages, including capital adjustment, capital utilization, consumer dynamics
with habit formation, and a monetary policy reaction function. The behavior of the
model is the outcome of the interaction of all of these processes together as it should be
in a DSGE model. Hence the e¤ect of pricing dynamics is not isolated as in the simple
QT framework of the previous section. The details of the model and calibration are
outlined in Appendix as in Dixon and Le Bihan (2012) using a notation consistent with
this paper.
We depict the IRFs for an interest rate shock16, which causes output and ination
to fall initially (as shown in Figures 3-6 and 3-7. We nd that again that only GT
pricing can generate hump-shaped reaction function for ination17. Here we see that the
16The focus of this chapter is on the e¤ect of monetary shock. However, we can nd some previous
studies on measuring the response to a technology shock in the framework of GT and GC. Dixon and Le
Bihan point out that after a persistent but non-permanent increase in productivity, marginal cost will
decline, which leads to a decrease in prices for the rst 5 quarters. As the shock dies away, the price
increase slowly back to its pre-shock level. See Dixon and Le Bihan (2012) for detail.
17According to empirical facts documented in Dixon and Kara (2010), monetary policy shocks have
persistent and delayed e¤ects on ination. Monetary policy has long and variable lags. Bank of
England has a point of view that the impact on ination might not peak for as long as eight quarters or
even more. The European Central Bank takes the view that the maximum impact is six quarters. Smets
and Wouters (2003) nd that the maximum e¤ect of monetary policy shock is about four quarters after
the policy
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Figure 3-6: IRF for monetary shock in the Smets and Wouters model with GTE price-
setting.
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Figure 3-7: IRF for monetary policy shock in the Smets and Wouters model with GCE
price-setting.
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GTE GCE
True
-11C
True
-67C
True
-570C
True
-11C
True
-67C
True
-570C
AD in
output
2.58% 0.88% 3.58% 3.71% 1.28% 3.58%
AD in
ination
3.08% 0.89% 3.27% 6.12% 2.06% 2.34%
Table 3.5: The di¤erence in IRF from QT model
di¤erences between the 4 IRFs are much smaller and less visible when compared to the
QT model. This is probably because the structure of the dynamics is also determined
by the rest of the models complex dynamics, which leaves less room for the precise
distribution of price-spell durations to matter. However, we still calculate the average
relative di¤erences between the "true" and di¤erent disaggregate level Calvo type, which
are shown in the Table 3.5.
If we take the results from the simulations of both the QT model and the SW model,
we can see that the microeconomic di¤erences in durations do not matter that much.
We are comparing hypothetical distributions derived from the sectoral frequencies under
the assumption that within each sector there is a Calvo distribution corresponding to
the frequency. As we have seen, whilst the aggregate distributions implied by this may
have a similar mean and median to the true distribution, the shape di¤ers signicantly
and in particular there is no 12 month spike. The results of the simulations imply that
these micro di¤erences do not matter in practice. In the SW model, the di¤erences in
distribution seem to have almost no observable e¤ect on the IRFs.
Why is it that the hypothetical Calvo models seem to work well despite their poor
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t at the microeconomic level. We believe that there is on prime reason for this: the
macroeconomic models use a quarterly calibration, which in e¤ect smoothes out some
of the di¤erences we observed in the monthly data. From the perspective of GTE, for
example, the 12 month spike gets smoothed out. This is shown in the Figure 3-8, in which
the "true" quarterly distribution is compared to the corresponding quarterly distributions
for the "11c", "67c", "570c" distributions and "ac" the distribution implied by the single
aggregate Calvo frequency. The quarterly "true" distribution shows a lack of 12 month
spike. And the Calvo implied distributions at di¤erent aggregate level are all quite similar
to the "True" one, except for the "ac" which has a big hump in quarter 2.
If we look at the quarterly model from the perspective of GCE, we need to compare
the quarterly hazards between the Calvo pricing at di¤erent aggregate level and the
"true" one which is from estimated hazard function. Following Dixon (2012), given
a distribution across rms by  2 F 1. The corresponding hazard prole that will
generate this distribution in steady state is given by h 2 [0; 1]F 1 where:
hi =
i
i
 
FX
j=i
j
j
! 1
(3.16)
Therefore, we can calculate the monthly hazard for the Calvo pricing at di¤erent ag-
gregate level by using the equation 3:16, and the relevant monthly survival rate will be
obtained accordingly. This can then be converted into a quarterly hazard rate.
We plot the quarterly hazard functions in the Figure 3-9. The hazard functions from
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Figure 3-8: Quarterly distribution of duration across rms.
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Calvo pricing at di¤erent aggregate level are downward sloping smoothly18resulting of
aggregation of heterogeneous price setters (see Alvarez 2008). The "true" hazard function
is also generally downward sloping, with several small spikes. In general, the hazards from
di¤erent disaggregate level of Calvo pricing are quite similar to the "true" hazard. The
aggregate Calvo on the other hand has a constant hazard and looks quite unlike the
"true" hazard.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we asked the question what can the sectoral data on the frequency of
price-change tell us? On the theoretical level, sectoral frequencies tell us what expected
duration of a price-spell is. This is of some interest, but from a macroeconomic per-
spective we are more interested in the behavior of the economic agents setting prices -
the cross-sectional distribution is of much more interest. Unfortunately the frequency
itself says little about the cross-sectional distribution: to uncover this we need to make
additional assumptions. However, we are able to say what the theoretical minimum
cross-sectional mean duration is consistent with an observed frequency: it is the mean
duration of a price-spell which occurs when all price-spells in the sector have the same or
almost the same length. However, the cross-sectional mean can be much longer: intu-
18The Calvo implied hazards are generally downward sloping. However, after 12 quarters, these
hazards become upward sloping. This is due to the truncation. For Calvo pricing, truncation means
that the
PF
j=i
j
j is smaller than it is under the innite sum. The reciprocal of the smaller sum is the
main reason that the hazard is biased upwards after 12 quarters.
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Figure 3-9: Quarterly hazard functions comparison.
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itively, rms that have prices that last for a long time do not reset their prices very often.
These rms contribute little to the monthly frequency but add a lot to the cross-sectional
mean.
When we look at the UK data using an estimated hazard function, we nd that the UK
data is a long way from the distribution implied by the theoretical minimum. Looking
at di¤erent levels of disaggregation, we nd that whilst the minimum theoretical mean
duration is around 5.5-6.7 months, the actual data reveals a mean of almost 11 months.
We also nd that the more disaggregated the data, the closer are both the median and
mean to the true values. We also look at the aggregate data using the hypothesis that
the sectoral frequencies are generated by a Calvo distribution. Under this assumption,
the cross-sectional mean is much larger than the minimum, and gets closer to the actual
mean as you become more disaggregated, with the most disaggregated having almost
exactly the same mean and median as the data. Whilst the mean and median of the
hypothetical Calvo distribution can be close to the actual values, the shape di¤ers in two
distinct ways: rstly, there is no 12 month spike, secondly there are not enough exible
prices. When we look at the COICOP 11 sectors, we nd that the Calvo distribution
hypothesis does not work very well: there is considerable heterogeneity across sectors in
terms of the cross-sectional distribution and hazard function.
However, we do nd that whilst the Calvo distribution hypothesis di¤ers from the
estimated distribution both at the aggregate and sectoral levels, it nonetheless works
at the aggregate level. This is because of a combination of two factors. First, along
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with getting the mean and median correct, the Calvo distribution also generates a nice
long fat tail. Second, DSGE models are calibrated using quarterly periods rather than
monthly: when we move to quarterly data, the di¤erences which look signicant at
the monthly level get averaged out to a large extent. This means that when we
look at the behavior of DSGE models under the Calvo distribution hypothesis, they
behave in a very similar way to models calibrated with the microdata. This sug-
gests that we can use the disaggregated frequency data (the more disaggregated the
better) to calibrate DSGE models when we do not have reliable hazard function esti-
mates or access to the price microdata as was done by Dixon and Kara (2010, 2011).
3.7 Appendix:
3.7.1 Data description
The data is described in some detail by Bunn and Ellis (2012a) so our description will
be brief. The ONS collect a longitudinal micro data set of monthly price quotes from
over ten thousand outlets to compute the national index of consumer prices. There are
two basic price collection methods: local and central. Local collection is used for most
items. There are about 150 areas (e.g. Cardi¤, ) around the UK, and around 120,000
quotations are obtained each month by local collection. For some items, collection in
individual shops across the 150 areas is not required- for example, for larger chain stores
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who have a national pricing policy or where the price is the same for all UK residents or
the regional variation in prices can be collected centrally. The data that we were able
to access for this study via the VML at Newport (Wales) consists of the locally collected
data covering about two thirds of total CPI (centrally collected data covers about 33%
of CPI). The sample spans over the time period from January 1996 to December 2007
and contains between 112,676 (1996) and 99,524 (2007) elementary price quotations per
month, with a resulting dataset of around 14 million price observations. The coverage
and classication of the CPI indices are based on the international classication system
for household consumption expenditures known as COICOP (classication of individual
consumption by purpose). This is a hierarchical classication system comprising: divi-
sions e.g. 01 Food and non-alcoholic beverages, groups e.g. 01.1 Food, and classes (the
lowest published level) e.g. 01.1.1 Bread and cereals. As table 3.6 shows, the division
Food and non-alcoholic beverages accounts for about 17% of the CPI weight in the sub-
sample available in the dataset. Education is not contained in the VML dataset, as
these prices are all collected centrally: but all other CPI divisions have locally collected
observations and are included in the dataset.
In our CPI research data set, each individual price quote consists of information on the
item code, the outlet, the region, the date etc. The product category at the elementary
level is dened as an item - for example large loaf, white, unsliced (800g). However, the
data has been anonymized with respect to the variety and brand of the product. With
the information on the item i, the shop j, the location k, and the date t, we can construct
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COICOP division Percent Cum.
Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages 17.62 17.62
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 7.05 24.67
Clothing and Footwear 9.32 33.98
Housing and Utilities 6.54 40.52
Furniture and Home Maintenance 11.34 51.86
Health 1.89 53.75
Transport 10.35 64.1
Communications 0.17 64.27
Recreation and Culture 9.85 74.12
Education 0 74.12
Restaurants and Hotels 17.54 91.67
Miscellaneous Goods and Services 8.33 100
Total 100
Table 3.6: CPI share in COICOP sectors
"Percent" shows the percentage of weighted number of observations in each COICOP
division."Cum." shows the cumulative distribution.
a price trajectory Pijk;t, which is sequence of price quotes for a specic item belonging
to a product category in a specic shop over time. Specically, we take two sequential
price quotes belong to the same price trajectory if they have the same product identity,
location and shop code. There are about 614; 000 price trajectories. And the average
length of each price trajectory is about 24 months. Each trajectory will consist of a
sequence of one or more price-spells: there are 3,174,692 price-spells in the data (i.e. on
average about 5 price-spells per trajectory).
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3.7.2 Comparing sectoral distribution of DAF with distribution
of Calvo
This section examines the distribution of the duration of price spells at the COICOP
11 sectoral level. As in the aggregate data, we estimate the sectoral hazard functions
using the KM non-parametric method and the corresponding cross-sectional DAF. We
then compare these with the sectoral Calvo distributions in three ways. First, and most
straightforwardly, we are comparing the distribution of DAF with the distribution of
Calvo in each of 11 COICOP sectors with the "eye ball test". Even though this is not
a strict statistical test, it can give us an impression how close or how far the two kinds
of distributions are di¤erent. Second, we examine the distributional assumption using
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic quanties a distance be-
tween the empirical distribution function of the sample and the cumulative distribution
function of the reference distribution (in our case, the reference distribution is Calvo
distribution). Since we have such a large sample of price spells, this is a very strict test:
standard errors are very small so that even small deviations of the reference distribution
will lead to its rejection. Third, we propose a method to calculating the relative absolute
di¤erence. Instead of calculate the di¤erence with cumulative distribution function like
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we compute the di¤erence of the pdf of the two distributions.
Then, we divide the sum of the absolute di¤erences by 2,since the mass of each distribu-
tion is 1. This method can provide us the deviation of the DAF from Calvo distribution
in percentage. This is a descriptive statistic rather than a test, but it provides a measure
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of "overlap".
Distribution graphs: DAF vs. Calvo
Follow the derivation in Dixon (2010), we derive the cross-sectional distribution (DAF)
from hazard function estimated by Kaplan-Meier method. As the distribution graphs
show, there are signicant di¤erences between the distribution of DAF and the distribu-
tion of Calvo in most COICOP sectors. First, the Calvo distribution has less one-period
price-spells than DAF, indicating that Calvo price setting mechanism fails to replicate the
evidence of large volume of exible price setters. Second, there is no 12-month spike in
Calvo distribution. But this 12-month spike does appear in many COICOP sectors, such
as health, housing, culture, etc.. Third, the distribution of DAF is non-monotonic even
in the long period, and the DAF has a fatter long tail comparing to Calvo. Again,Calvo
distribution miss the part of sticky price setters. Above all, the sectoral Calvo underes-
timates the heterogeneity within each sector.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic for a given cumulative distribution function F (x) is
Dn = sup
x
jFn (x)  F (x) j
where sup x is the supremum of the set of distances. By the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem,
if the sample comes from distribution F (x), then Dn converges to 0 almost surely. Kol-
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COICOP Sectors Distance K-alpha/sqrt(n) Test result
Food & Beverages 0.293 0.009 Reject null
Alcoholic & Tobacco 0.130 0.060 Reject null
Clothing & Footwear 0.281 0.060 Reject null
Housing & Utilities 0.401 0.049 Reject null
Furniture & Home 0.377 0.013 Reject null
Health 0.399 0.078 Reject null
Transport 0.161 0.111 Reject null
Communications 0.227 0.136 Reject null
Recreation & Culture 0.337 0.090 Reject null
Restaurants & Hotels 0.105 0.102 Reject null
Miscellaneous 0.295 0.082 Reject null
Table 3.7: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test results.
mogorov strengthened this result, by e¤ectively providing the rate of this convergence.
In practice, the statistic requires relatively large number of data to properly reject the
null hypothesis.
Under null hypothesis that the sample comes from the hypothesized distribution
F (x),
p
nDn
n!1! sup
t
jB (F (t)) j
in distribution, where B (t) is the Brownian bridge. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is con-
structed by using the critical values of the Kolmogorov distribution. The null hypothesis
is rejected at level  if
p
nDn > K;
where K is found from
Pr (K  K) = 1  :
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As described in Table3.7, the test results reject that sectoral distribution of DAF
is the same as sectoral Calvo distribution. This result is consistent with the nding in
Matsuoka (2009), who found that over 90 percent of the 429 tested items in the Japanese
retail price data for 2000-2005 reject the hypothesis that the underlying distribution is
exponential, which corresponds to the time-dependent pricing model of Calvo.
Relative di¤erence:DAF vs. Calvo
We propose a new method to calculating the relative absolute di¤erence between the
distribution of DAF and the Calvo distribution. We calculate and absolute di¤erence
point-by-point for probability density function between two distributions:
di = jfDAF   fCalvoj
and then we add up all the di and let it be divided by 2. We denote the result as RD
RD =
PT
i=1 di
2
The results of relative di¤erence are shown in Table 3.8.
3.7.3 The log-linearised Smets and Wouters Model (2003)
Following Dixon and Le Bihan (2012), we present the full list of log-linearised Smets-
Wouters model below.
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COICOP Relative Di¤erence (DAF Vs. Calvo)
Food and Non-Alcoholic 0.36
Alcoholic 0.18
Cloth and footwear 0.33
Housing and utilities 0.49
Furniture and home maintanance 0.44
Health 0.58
Transportation 0.23
Communication 0.35
Recreation and culture 0.41
Restaurant and hotel 0.20
Miscellaneous goods 0.37
Table 3.8: Relative Di¤erence: DAF vs. Calvo
First, the consumption Euler equation with habit persistence:
c^t =
b
1  b c^t 1 +
1
1 + b
c^t+1   1  b
(1 + b)c
(rt   Ett+1) + 1  b
(1 + b)c
"bt :
Second, the investment equation:
I^t =
1
1 + 
I^t 1 +

1 + 
EtI^t+1 +

1 + 
qt + "
I
t :
Here I^t is investment in log-deviation, qt is the shadow real price of capital,  is the
inverted investment adjustment cost.
Third, Tobins q equation
qt =   (rt   Ett+1) + 1  
1   + rkEtqt+1 +
rk
1   + rkEtr^
k
t+1 + 
Q
t
where  is the rate of depreciation, rk is the rental rate of capital.
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Capital accumulation:
K^t = (1  ) K^t 1 +  I^t 1
Wage equation:
W^t   P^t = 
1 + 

EtW^t+1   P^t+1

+
1
1 + 

W^t 1   P^t 1

+

1 + 
Ett+1
 1 + w
1 + 
t +
w
1 + 
t 1
  1
1 + 
(1  w) (1  w)
1 + 1+w
w


w

W^t   P^t   LL^t   c
1  h (c^t   hc^t 1) + "
L
t

+ Wt
Labour demand:
L^t =  W^t + (1 +  ) rkt + K^t 1
Goods supply
Y^t = K^t 1 +  r^Kt +  (1  ) L^t + "^At
Goods demand
Y^t = (1  ky   gy) c^t + ky I^t + gy"^gt
Monetary policy
{^t = {^t 1 + (1  )
h
t + r (^t 1   t) + rY

Y^t   Y^ Pt
i
+r (^t   ^t 1) + rY
h
Y^t   Y^ Pt

 

Y^t 1   Y^ Pt 1
i
+ Rt
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Parameter Value Interpretation
 0.99 Discount rate
 0.025 Depreciation rate
 0.30 Capital share
w 0.5 Mark-up wage
 1 6.771 Inv.adj.cost
c 1.353 Consumption utility elasticity
b 0.573 Habit formation
L 2.400 Labour utility elasticity
 0.169 Capital util.adj.cost
Reaction function coe¢ cients:
r 1.684 Response to ination
r 0.140 Response to change in ination
 0.961 Response to lagged interest rate
ry 0.099 Response to the output gap
ry 0.159 Response to change in the output gap
a 0.823 Persistence, productivity shock
Table 3.9: Calibration Parameters
Shocks are specied below:
"at = a"
a
t 1 + 
a
t
"bt = b"
b
t 1 + 
b
t
"It = I"
I
t 1 + 
I
t
"Qt = Q"
Q
t 1 + 
Q
t
"gt = g"
g
t 1 + 
g
t
The Calibration of the parameters is based on the mode of the posterior estimates,
as reported in Smets and Wouters (2003).
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Chapter 4
The time-varying Ss rule: an
application to the UK PPI micro
data
4.1 Introduction
At the heart of New Keynesian models is the assumption that nominal rigidities - most
notably price stickiness - are preventing resources from being allocated e¢ ciently. There
is a large amount of theoretical research which focused on the micro foundations of
sticky prices, which is a key element in explanations of the real e¤ects of monetary
policy. However, the empirical literature on price stickiness has been relatively thin. In
recent years, large-scale data sets of individual prices, in particular those assembled for
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the purpose of constructing price indices, have been made available to researchers. The
empirical research has signicantly broadened knowledge about the prevalence of price
stickiness, and the characteristics of individual price changes.
One typical nding of the empirical studies using micro price data is that prices at the
micro level remain unchanged for some periods. And this stylized fact was documented
in, among many others, Bils and Klenow (2004), Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008), and
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), who study consumer prices in the U.S., and Dhyne et
al. (2006) and Vermeulen et al. (2006), who give a synthesis of studies carried out in
euro area. For example, Dhyne et al. (2006) nd that the monthly frequency of consumer
price changes is about 15% in the euro area. These results are consistent with evidence
from survey data (see Fabiani et al. 2005).
The infrequent adjustment observed in micro price data is often described by an
Ss rule. The Ss rule model indicating that there is a range of values of state variable
for which it is optimal not to adjust. This range of state is called "band of inaction".
Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) derived the Ss rule from optimal price setting problem in
the presence of adjustment cost. The ensuing empirical studies show that Ss rules are
convenient reduced forms which can be confronted to the data.
However, the standard xed Ss band model faces some empirical di¢ culties. It in-
deed predicts that prices become more likely to change the longer they have remained
unchanged. If we dene the hazard of a price change at time t is the probability that
price will change after t periods given that it has survived for t periods. The standard
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xed Ss band model suggests that the hazard function of price change is upward sloping.
This prediction is at variance with patterns often observed in micro price data. Naka-
mura and Steinsson (2008) nd that the hazard function of regular prices is somewhat
downward sloping for the rst few months and then mostly at after that, and they do
not nd any evidence of upward-sloping hazard function. Furthermore, they nd that
"the hazard function including sales is much more steeply downward sloping than the
hazard function of regular prices". Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) conrm the nding of
downward sloping hazard function and give a possible explanation that the downward
sloping hazards reect the time-varying Ss band. Gautier and Le Bihan (2011) also point
out that the hazard decreases with the size of the threshold.
In this chapter, I aim to analyze the determinants of hazard rate of price changes.
Firms decision to change its price is described as a time-varying Ss model. The time-
varying Ss model is set up in a way that is consistent with the stylized fact I obtained
from UK PPI micro data. Then a duration model is set up which is in line with the
time-varying Ss model. More specically, the duration model is specied in form of Cox
proportional hazard, which is formed by two parts: a baseline hazard function and a
function with covariates of interest. The baseline hazard function can be seen as a term
which captures the feature that the threshold is time-varying. I estimate the duration
model which controls for observed and unobserved heterogeneity across rms in assessing
the e¤ect of changes in ination, interest rate, oil price, industrial output, and exchange
rate on the hazard rate of price changes.
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The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the PPI micro
data set and some stylized facts about price changes. Section 3 describes a time-varying
Ss band model. Section 4 gives empirical specication of the time-varying Ss band model
and describes the covariates of interest. In Section 5, I illustrate the estimated results. I
conclude in Section 6.
4.2 The data set and some stylized facts
4.2.1 Data description
This study uses micro-dataset on producer prices collected by the O¢ ce for National
Statistics (ONS)1. These individual price quotes are weighted and aggregated to form
domestic Producer Price Index.2 There are two types of PPI series: output price indices
and input indices. The output price indices measure the change in the price of goods
sold by UK manufacturers, and input price indices measure the change in price of goods
bought by manufacturers for use in the manufacturing process. Due to the data availabil-
ity, this study only focuses on the output prices. Products are grouped with the Standard
Industrial Classication (SIC) with weighting patterns based on overall sales by manu-
factures within those groupings. The PPI uses sales data taken from PRODCOM survey
1This work contains statistical data from ONS which is Crown copyright and reproduced with the
permission of the controller of HMSO and Queens Printer for Scotland. The use of the ONS statistical
data in this work does not imply the endorsement of the ONS in relation to the interpretation or
analysis of the statistical data. This work uses research data sets which may not exactly reproduce
National Statistics aggregates.
2The micro data that underlie the producer price index used in this research were made accessible
via VML. The terms and condition of the VML is described in Richie (2008).
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to update weights. Price quotes are collected from the products which are manufactured
in the UK and sold to the home market, excluding VAT and after discounts. Price quotes
reect orders delivered in current month, and they reect actual prices achieved rather
than any notional list price. Excise duties (on cigarettes, tobacco, alcoholic etc.) are
included to compile PPI. Above all, service sector prices are not included in the PPI.
As stated in Morris and Green (2007), the output producer price index (PPI), pro-
duced by the O¢ ce for National Statistics (ONS), is exposed to several sources of po-
tential error. The total error consists of two elements, the sampling error and the non-
sampling error. The random sampling techniques are used to minimize the sampling
error. However, non-sampling errors are not easy to quantify and include errors of cover-
age, measurement processing and non-response. Various procedures are in place to ensure
that errors are minimized. Validation checks on data, based on percentage movements
from quarter to quarter, are conducted to highlight unusual price changes for items.
Disparities in data are investigated by contacting respondents if not explained on the
returned form. Letters are sent to respondents where no price change has been evident
for eighteen months and analysts liaise with respondents to ensure that the prices they
provide meet the specied criteria.
The nal dataset that our analysis is based on included approximately 960; 000 in-
dividual producer price quotes, covering 24; 000 products by 12; 000 rms. Our sample
covers the period between January 1998 and February 2008. The PPI basket is updated
annually to incorporate new products and changes in demand patterns for existing prod-
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ucts. While there are around 1; 050 products are present in our data set for all 122
months, less than 5% of total. On average, a product is included in our "raw"3 data set
for about 37 months.
The PPI computer programs impute for non-response in the most recent few months.
Thus if the price £ 14.99 is recorded for a specic item in date t, but the price information
becomes unavailable for following 9 months. Then the PPI computer programs let the
prices for that 9 months remain at £ 14.99. Imputation can help avoid the data gaps,
mitigating the problem induced by censored price spells. However,as the duration of
missing price quote keeps longer, an unobserved price change becomes more and more
likely. Another disadvantage of imputation is that they are not true price observations
but are "pseudo observations", which would introduce an upward bias in the estimation
of the duration of price spells. Therefore, we discard the price spells with imputation
prices. Above all, Imputation represents about 3% of our PPI research dataset.
In our PPI dataset, we do not have weights which are attached to individual price
quotes before 2003. Following Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) and Gopinath and Rigobon
(2008), we obtain value weights for the PPI at the four digit SIC commodity code, then
divide the value weights equally within the four-digit code, calculating the weight for
each price quote within the same item group by same method. Although the calculated
weights are not necessarily equal to the actual PPI weights,as the result of a robustness
check shows,the e¤ect on aggregate measures of the statistics described in next section
3Here "raw" data set means the data set provided by ONS without any ltering or manipulation.
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is trivial.
As described in Chapter2, censoring is an important characteristic of price data, and
it needs to be taken into account. Censoring is dened as when the failure event occurs
and the subject is not under observation. In our sample we have a total of 162,731 price
spells. Of those, 122,462 (75.25%) are uncensored, 18,681 (11.48%) are left censored,
15,787 (9.7%) are right censored, and 5,801 (3.6%) are double censored.
4.2.2 The frequency of price changes
The frequency of price changes can be dened as the ratio of the number of non-zero price
changes observations divided by the total number of observations. Following previous
studies (e.g. Alvarez et al, 2010; Bunn and Ellis, 2012b), the observations that there is
no information on the price in the previous month are dropped from our sample. It is not
possible to measure whether the prices has changed for these observations. As reported in
Table 4.2.2, for all items in our sample of producer prices, the weighted average frequency
of price change is 25.1%. It means that about a quarter of prices change each month.
This result is similar to the estimate in Bunn and Ellis (2012b), in which they claim that
an average of 26% of UK producer prices changed each month. Moreover, our result is
somewhat higher than Alvarez et al.(2010) for Spain (21%), Cornille and Dossche (2008)
for Belgium (24%), Dias et al. (2008) for Portugal (23%), Stahl (2006) for Germany
(23%). Our result is almost the same as Gautier (2008) for France (25%), and Nakamura
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and Steinsson (2008) for the U.S.(25%).4 Above all, the producer prices are changed
infrequently, and this is against a few theoretical pricing models which predict that prices
would change every period, (e.g. the sticky information (Mankiw and Reis, 2002); Calvo
with indexation (Smets and Wouters, 2003); Quadratic costs of adjustment (Rotemberg,
1982). As discussed in Chapter2, a menu costs model can be easily calibrated to t the
observed frequency of micro price changes.
The frequency of price changes varies substantially across product sectors. The ex-
ibility of prices is the largest for energy sector, in which about 66% of prices change
each month. The prices of intermediate goods and consumer food products change more
frequently than capital goods and consumer durables. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.2.2
report monthly frequencies of price increases and decreases respectively, for all items and
the main product groups. Column ve reports the proportion of price decreases over the
total number of price changes. Over 44% of price adjustments are price decreases, which
gives evidence against the downward nominal rigidity hypothesis.
There is also a considerable heterogeneity in the frequency of price changes at the 2
digit industry level. As can be seen from Table 4.2.2, the prices of clothing and leather
change least often among all of the 2 digit industries. While the price of petrol and
secondary raw materials change far more often than that of the other 2 digit industries.
Clothing is the only industry with the share of price decreases over the total number of
4However, we must notice that this is a very rough comparison. In each countrys PPI data, the
sampling scheme and the weight scheme are di¤erent. Furthermore, the time periods covered in each
study are country specic.
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Main component All changes Increases Decreases % of price decreases
Energy 65.9 39.0 26.9 40.8
Consumer food products 24.6 13.9 10.7 43.5
Consumer non-food non-durables 15.0 7.6 7.4 49.3
Consumer durables 17.7 8.9 8.8 49.7
Intermediate goods 25.1 14.1 11.0 43.8
Capital goods 18.6 10.1 8.5 45.7
All items 25.1 14.0 11.1 44.2
Table 4.1: Percentage of UK producer prices that change each month
price changes larger than 50%. In other words, we are more likely to observe price cuts
in clothing industry. In sharp contrast, we are more likely to observe price increases in
tobacco industry.
4.2.3 The unconditional hazard function
A price reset hazard function gives the probability of resetting a price conditional on the
time elapsed since last adjustment. As discussed in Chapter2 and 3, the hazard function
is important for aggregate dynamics, since it is closely related to the distribution of price
spells, which in turn a¤ects how the economy reacts to nominal disturbances.
The classic Kaplan-Meier method is widely used to estimate the unconditional hazard
function, excluding all left-censored spells, keeping all right censored spells, and treat the
end of a right censored data as a loss(or non-price-change). This treatment of right
censored spells is not a good one, because it leads to an under-estimate of the hazard
for each period. Dixon et al. (2012) proposed two alternatives treating censored data:
(a) They exclude all censored data in estimating the hazard function. (b) They treat
right-censoring as a price-change (loss is failureor LIF), which is also a strategy used by
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Industry All changes Increases Decreases
Food and beverages 24.2 12.9 11.3
Tobacco 28.2 22.0 6.2
Textiles 14.6 7.9 6.7
Clothing 9.1 4.4 4.7
Leather 13.0 6.8 6.2
Wood 15.5 9.3 6.2
Pulp and paper 18.0 10.0 8.0
Media 19.3 10.0 9.3
Petrol and fuel 65.9 39.0 26.9
Chemicals 24.8 13.4 11.4
Rubber and plastic 19.5 11.4 8.1
Other non-metallic mineral products 35.3 19.0 16.3
Basic metals 39.7 23.1 16.5
Fabricated metal products 19.3 10.7 8.6
Machinery and equipment 12.8 7.6 5.3
O¢ ce machinery and computers 22.7 11.5 11.3
Electrical machinery 14.9 8.2 6.7
Radio and TV equipment 17.6 9.1 8.5
Precision instruments 15.1 8.0 7.1
Vehicles 21.2 11.2 10.0
Other transport 21.4 10.5 10.8
Furniture 16.4 8.2 8.2
Secondary raw materials 65.8 34.9 30.9
Table 4.2: Percentage of UK producer prices that change each month by 2 digit industry
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Dixon and Le Bihan (2012). Because the longer spells are more likely to be censored. The
method (a) is more likely to overestimate the hazard in the short term. The method (b)
is the opposite extreme to the classic KM assumption and more likely to overestimate
the hazard. Figure 4-1 displays the hazard functions estimated under three methods.
Even though the three methods di¤er in the treatment of right-censored spells, they all
generate similar hazard functions. There are three main characteristics in Figure 4-1:
1 All three hazard functions display a downward sloping pattern.
2 All three hazard functions exhibit signicant spikes at 12 months and at 24 months.
3 All three hazard functions exhibit that a large proportion of 1-month-length price spells.
As can be seen in Figure 4-1, the hazard generated from method LIFlies between the
estimates from Uncensoredand classic KM. The method KMtends to underestimate
the hazard, while the method Uncensored is more likely to overestimate the hazard
in the short term. These ndings suggest that the LIFmethod is a better method
to estimate the unconditional hazard function. Dixon et al. (2012) also nd that the
approaches of using only uncensored data and treating right censoring as a price-change
both result in very similar monthly cross-sectional distribution (distribution across rms).
And the calibration in their paper actually uses the loss is failuremethod.
The downward sloping hazard function might reect the "aggregation of heteroge-
neous price setter". There are rms with sticky pricing strategies and those with exible
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Figure 4-1: Unconditional hazard function
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pricing strategies. The rms with exible pricing strategies are more likely to be in the
"young age" zone. As rms become older, the share of price changes by rms with exi-
ble pricing strategy will decrease. As argued in Alvarez (2008), only price changes which
belong to sticky rms can be observed at high ages. In Chapter2, I extended the simple
menu costs model to multiple-sector menu costs model. The simulated hazard function
exhibit downward sloping pattern.
An alternative explanation to the declining hazard is the time-varing "Ss band", or
the width of the inaction region (Klenow and Krytsov 2008). When a rm faces persistent
idiosyncratic shock with high level, it tends to sell a large quantity under a low price.
Therefore, the prot of the rm is mainly decided by choosing the right price. This will
lead to a narrow Ss band. However, when the idiosyncratic shock is at low level, the
rms inaction region becomes wider. Furthermore, when Ss band is narrow and hazard
rate is high, the young prices are more common; while the old prices are more common
when Ss band is wider and hazard rate is lower.
4.3 Time-varying Ss band model
The decision rule of price-setting can be described as an Ss rule model. Ss rules are con-
venient reduced forms that can be confronted to the micro data. Sheshinski et al. (1981)
and Dahlby (1992) rstly estimate this class of reduced form models. Recently, Fisher
and Konieczny (2006) and Dhyne et al.(2011) estimate Ss models with random thresholds
using micro price data for many categories of product. As suggested by Caballero and
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Engel (1999) and Hall and Rust (2000), models assuming a random adjustment costs
can rationalized the time-varying random Ss bands, which gives rise to hazard rates that
vary over time for a given rm.
Let pij;t 1 is the actual price of a product i within the industry group j at time period
t  1, pijt is the optimal price at period t. The actual price will keep the same as long as
the di¤erence between the actual price and optimal price is less or equal to the width of
inaction st. Here we allow for time-varying pricing thresholds. Therefore, we have such
a simple specication of (S,s) model, which can be written as
pijt = pij;t 1 if jpijt   pij;t 1j  st (4.1)
pijt = p

ijt if jpijt   pij;t 1j > st
As we have seen in previous section, price setting is considerably heterogeneous across
industries. At the industry level, some price trajectories represented by more frequently
changing prices, while others are represented by less frequently changing prices. There-
fore we can extend model (4.1) to allow for time-varying and industry-specic pricing
thresholds, which can be written as
pijt = pij;t 1 if jpijt   pij;t 1j  sjt (4.2)
pijt = p

ijt if jpijt   pij;t 1j > sjt
Lets assume such circumstance that the ination rate is positive and steady. As
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time proceeds, jpijt   pij;t  j grows steadily5 until it exceeds the level dictated by the
rule. When the gap jpijt   pij;t  j surpasses the "adjustment threshold", the price will
change. Therefore, the probability of observing a price change at time t, conditional on
that the price has been kept the same for some time periods  , will be the probability
that the gap jpijt   pij;t  j is larger than the threshold sjt, which is
Pr
jpijt   pij;t  j > sjt	 (4.3)
We can use a semi-parametric survival function to develop an empirical specication of
equation (4.3).However, to get a good understanding of the determinants of the hazard
function, we need to analyze the factors which can a¤ect the optimal price change.
To simplify the notation, we drop the subject i, j, and let z be the indicator of the
rm (product). Di¤erent from Chapter2, we assume that a rm produce according to
the CES production function (using labor and capital as inputs):
yzt = Azt (l

zt + k

zt)

 (4.4)
From this equation (4.4) , we dene the following variables. The rm produce yzt output
in period t. In order to produce this amount of output in period t, the rm need to employ
a quantity of labour as lzt and a quantity of capital kzt.  is an elasticity of substitution
parameter.  is a parameter measuring return of scale. A rm-specic technology in
5Caplin and Spulber (1987) assume the growth of money will raise pijt .
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period t can be dened as Azt. Di¤erentiated goods yzt can be used to produce a nal
consumption good Yt. We assume the production function exhibit a CES love of variety
over a continuum of di¤erentiated goods y that are indexed by z 2 [0; 1] :
Yt =
Z 1
0
yzt
 1
 dz
 
 1
:
And we assume the corresponding unit cost function Pt is:
Pt =
Z 1
0
pzt
1 dz
 1
1 
:
where pzt denotes the nominal price the rm charges in period t: is the elasticity of
demand. As is standard in this setup, the demand for the output of rm z is given by
yzt =

pzt
Pt
 
Yt (4.5)
where yzt denotes the quantity demanded of the rms good. Firms cost function can
be shown as c (yzt; t) = y
1=
zt A
 1=
zt t.  is a return to scale parameter, and t represents
input prices. Then the rm will choose a price to maximize its prots:
max
pzt

pzt
Pt
 mct

yzt (4.6)
s:t: yzt =

pzt
Pt
 
Yt
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where mct describes the rms marginal cost function. Solving the rst order condition
of the model (4.6), we can get the optimal price pt (z) =

 1mctPt, which is just the
markup pricing condition of monopolistic competition. If we assume the Pt grows with
the ination rate _Pt = t, then we can describe the gap jpijt   pij;t  j as a function of
ination and the change in marginal cost. Since the change of optimal price is a function
of the ination and rms marginal cost, the gap jpijt pij;t  j is also an implicit function
of the ination and rms marginal cost, given the actual price has remain as previous
optimal price for some period.
jpijt   pij;t  j = F (t; _mct) = Z (t)  (4.7)
The vector Z (t) includes all the covariates of interest, and it will be specied in next
section, and also the regression coe¢ cient vector  will be estimated.
4.4 Empirical specication
In this section we develop an estimable model consisting of empirical versions of the
equation(4.3) and (4.7). It is well known that OLS is not a good method to analyze sur-
vival data. Because it assumes the residuals to be distributed normally, which is equiv-
alent to say that time to an event(failure) is assumed to follow a normal distribution.
For example, if we are thinking about an case of Calvo pricing which the instantaneous
risk of price changing is constant over time. Then the distribution of time (duration)
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would follow an exponential distribution. Moreover, the duration (time to failure) is al-
ways positive, while theoretically, the normal distribution is supported on the entire real
line. Therefore, we will choose survival analysis (duration model). Similar approaches
have been adopted in previous studies, such as Aucremmne and Dyhne (2005), Dias
et al. (2007),Fougere et al. (2007), Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), Matsuoka (2010),
and Vasquez-Ruiz (2011).At its core, survival analysis concerns nothing more than mak-
ing a substitution for the normality assumption characterized by OLS with some more
appropriate for the problem at hand.
We rst recall that the general denition of hazard function. The hazard function,
in our context, investigates the probability of a price change conditional on the elapsed
duration of a price spell. The hazard function can be dened as h (t) = f(t)
S(t)
, where
S (t) is the survival function, and f (t) is the density function. The survival function
can be dened as S (t) = Pr (T  t) = 1  F (t) where F (t) is the distribution function
of the duration variable T , and F (t) 2 [0; 1]. It is always a source of concern that the
results of analyses are being determined by the assumption. We would prefer a method
that does not require assumptions about the distribution of failure times. Cox (1972)
provided such an option, so called Cox model. In Cox model, the e¤ect of the exogenous
variable is specied as multiplying a baseline hazard function by a function that depends
on the exogenous variable. We can dene the hazard function of the ith cluster for the
kth failure type as
hki (t) = h0 (t) g (Z; )
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where h0 (t) is the baseline hazard function. The function g (Z; ) should be non-negative,
and it can be specied as:
g (Z; ) = exp (Z)
Recall that the probability of observing a price change at time t, conditional on that the
price has been kept the same for some time periods  , will be the probability that the
change in the gap between the optimal price and actual price, jpijt   pij;t  j , is larger
than the threshold sjt: Therefore, we have
Pr
jpijt   pij;t  j > sjt	 = h0 (t) expZki (t)  +  j	 (4.8)
= exp
 
 j

h0 (t)  exp (Zki (t) )
where  j captures the variation of thresholds among industries. h0 (t) can be seen as
a term which is implicitly a¤ected by the time-varying threshold. In Cox model, the
baseline hazard function can be estimated separately6 by performing an analysis at each
failure and only concerning with the order in which the failures occurred. No assumption
is made about the distribution of time to failure. We can obtain the maximum likelihood
estimates of  from Coxs partial likelihood function, L (). As proved by Lin (1994), the
estimator ^ is a consistent estimator and asymptotically normal as long as the marginal
models are correctly specied.
It may be too restricted to assume that the baseline hazard function is the same
6We drop all the left and double censored spells. And we apply the "LIF" method when right-
censoring is treated.
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across di¤erent industries. An alternative specication would be to assume that there
are industry-specied baseline functions hj0 (t). Therefore, we have following so-called
stratied-Cox model
hki (t) = hj0 (t)  exp (Zki (t) ) (4.9)
In order to account for unobservable heterogeneity, we follow Nakamura and Steins-
son (2008) and Matsuoka (2010) to build a semiparametric hazard model with shared
frailty. At the observation level, frailty is introduced as an unobservable multiplicative
e¤ect  on the hazard function. And the frailty  is a random positive quantity. For
purposes of model identiability,  is assumed to have mean one and variance . In line
with Nakamura and Steinsson(2008), we specify the unobserved heterogeneity as being
common to all observations within the same product. In another word, we assume that
the heterogeneities are not specic to a price spell, but are shared along the same price
trajectory. Frailty model can be written as
hki (t) = i  hj0 (t)  exp (Zki (t) ) (4.10)
where i follow a gamma distribution. We can test the existence of unobserved hetero-
geneity by using a likelihood-ratio test of H0 :  = 0.
The vector Z (t) includes some regressors varying with time which economic theory
suggests may be relevant factors in explaining the conditional probability of price change
over time. From previous section, the derivation of the time-varying Ss band model
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suggests that Z (t) should includes7: a) Ination rate, which is measured as the monthly
growth rate of the producer price index. It can be expected that the ination rate will
have a positive and signicant e¤ect on the hazard rate of price changes. The lead
and lag of ination rate could also a¤ect the probability of price change, these should
also be taken into consideration. b) Interest rate, the three-month Libor rate is chosen.
Because the aggregate demand is more responsive to the Libor rate than to the base
rate as it is the benchmark interest rate that inuences the interest rate at which the
private sector, both corporate and personal, can borrow. c) Oil price, a Brent series from
Bloomberg (Ticker:CO1 Comdty) is used. To construct the monthly series, daily closing
prices for all trading days are averaged within the month. It is suggested that the sharp
increase of oil prices is more like past supply shocks. And high oil price may change
ination expectations. d) Industrial production index. The industrial production index
has been used as a proxy to measure demand pressure. And previous nding suggests
that the probability of changing prices varies positively with the industry sales growth.
e) Nominal e¤ective exchange rate. It represents the relative value of a home countrys
currency compared to the other major currencies being traded. Two nominal e¤ective
exchange rate series (pound vs. U.S. dollar, pound vs. euro) are used. A higher nominal
e¤ective exchange rate means that the pound is worth more than an imported currency.
7Our model suggests that unit labor cost could be an explanatory variable. However, no wage micro
data is available and the if I use the average earning index as an approximate of the unit labor cost.
The regression subjects to the serious multicolinearity. The coe¢ cient on wage and most coe¢ cients on
the other covariates become insignicant. Hence, the unit labor cost is dropped from our estimation. I
argue that though this may lead to bias in the estimation result, the e¤ect wont be too much. Because
the other covariates may implicitly cover part of the change in the unit labor cost.
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The change in the e¤ective exchange rate would have both supply side and demand side
e¤ect.
4.5 Estimates
Figure 4-2 presents the aggregate baseline hazard function estimated from model 4.8. It
is very similar to the unconditional hazard function. It shows that the probability of a
rm to change its price after one month is about 60%. This probability drops sharply to a
level lower than 20% for the second and third month. The hazard rate jumps above 20%
at the 12th month. Afterwards, the hazard function becomes relatively at. After 60
months, the hazard function becomes more and more volatile. Because large amount of
price spells are either ended with price change or censored. All price spell will denitely
ends before or at the end of our sample period. Therefore, the baseline hazard rate equals
to 1 at the end of sample period.
Figure4-3 shows the sectoral baseline hazard functions. The baseline hazard function
in each product group (main sector) displays a downward sloping pattern which is similar
to the aggregate baseline hazard. Our nding is consistent with the nding in Nakamura
and Steinsson (2008). We can nd that the 12-month spikes in baseline hazard are quite
signicant in all sectors, except for the energy. The baseline hazard function for energy
goods di¤ers greatly from the other sectors. In particular, the spike at 1-month is more
pronounced for energy sector. In the energy sector, the rms change their price more
frequently. Furthermore, the energy sector is characterised by very short durations and
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within this sector, very few price spells are observed with duration longer than 18 months,
which makes the estimation of the hazard rates for longer durations very imprecise. There
is no price spell in energy sector with duration longer than 36 months. We also conduct
the log rank test to see whether the baseline hazard functions are the same across 6 main
sectors. The test result rejects the null hypothesis that
H0 : h01 (t) = h02 (t) = ::: = h06 (t)
Table4.6 reports the main estimation results under di¤erent specication of the Cox
model. The column (1) and (2) report the estimation from the equation (4:8). The
column (3) and (4) shows the estimated hazard rate model for price changes using the
stratied Cox model (equation 4.9). The last two column (5) and (6) report the estima-
tion result for the shared frailty model. The table 4:6 report the estimated hazard ratio
rather than coe¢ cient . The hazard ratio equivalent to exp (). Hence, if a hazard ratio
is greater than one, it means that the relevant variable has a positive e¤ect on the hazard
rate of price changes. While a hazard ratio less than one implies that the variable has a
negative e¤ect on the hazard rate of price changes. Above all, hazard ratio equals to one
when variable has no e¤ect on the hazard rate of price changes.
It can be seen that the estimated hazard ratio for the ination variable are highly
signicant across all specications. And all hazard ratios for ination variable are rela-
tively larger than one. It shows that the PPI ination rate positively and signicantly
a¤ect the hazard rate of price changes. Specically, if the monthly PPI ination rate
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increases by 1%, it will raise the probability that a rm will change its price about 7%
(hazard ratio lies with a range from 5% to about 9%), given that the price remains the
same until that time. Our result is economically large in magnitude comparing with the
previous ndings. For example, Cecchetti (1986) nd that a 5% increase in the ination
rate raises the instantaneous probability of price changes by 10%. However, Cecchetti
(1986) only have price data on several magazines. In our research data set, there are
over 240,000 products. Moreover, Cecchettis research focus on the retail shop, while our
study focus on the factory gate. The rms at an earlier point in the supply chain may
be more sensitive to the changes in aggregate price level. However, we also nd that,
neither the change of one-period lagged ination rate nor the change of one-period ahead
ination rate has a signicant e¤ect on the probability of price changes. It is worth not-
ing that the coe¢ cient on ination is highly signicant (p<.01). We are quite condent
that the increase in PPI ination will increase the hazard rate signicantly. Fourgere et
al. (2007) nd that the impact of the ination on the probability of a price change is
signicant. Moreover, their nding suggests an even larger impact of the ination.
The estimates show that the change in the interest rate will signicantly a¤ect the
hazard rate of price changes. A 1% increase in interest rate (Libor) rate, will lead to
about 4% to 8% increase in hazard rate of price changes. The change in oil price has a
signicant but very small positive e¤ect on the probability of changing prices. Moreover,
the change in industrial production and e¤ective exchange rate do have signicant e¤ect
on the hazard rate of price changes.
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We capture the unobservable heterogeneity by using frailty model. Notice that re-
gardless of the choice of frailty distribution, the frailty model reduces to non-frailty model
when variance of frailty equals to zero. That is to say, if  = 0, then h (t) = h (t). The
last two columns of table 4.6 report the estimation of . The likelihood ratio test suggests
that the null hypothesis that there is no heterogeneity present is strongly rejected. The
estimated hazard ratios from frailty model are generally higher than the estimates from
the other two models. This facts indicate that failure to account for the unobservable
heterogeneity may result in an underestimate of hazard ratio.
Overall, it is important to stress a point that the coe¢ cients associated to the time
varying regressors, which measure the state of the economy, are in general individually
signicant, using the likelihood ratio test, the null hypothesis that the included time
varying regressors are not jointly signicant is strongly rejected. Further more, even con-
trolling for di¤erent sources of heterogeneity, coe¢ cients associated to the time varying
regressors are statistically very signicant, suggests that the state dependent models are
likely to proved a reasonable approximation to the micro price data underlying the UK
PPI.
4.6 Conclusion
This study documents the main stylized facts of price-setting behaviour of British rms
over the period January 1998 to February 2008. We develop a time-varying Ss band
model and use the individual prices underlying the UK PPI to analyze the factors which
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can a¤ect the hazard rate of price changes through a semiparametric survival analysis
model that fully capture observable and unobservable heterogeneities among the individ-
ual rms. Instead of assuming the distribution for the baseline hazard function, we let
"data speak" and avoid the situation that the results of analyses are being determined by
the assumptions and not the data. The study presents statistically signicant evidence
that the economic environment a¤ects the hazard rate of price changes, which is consis-
tent with the predictions in state-dependent pricing models. We can summarize the key
empirical ndings as follows.
First, producer prices are moderately sticky. The weighted average frequency of price
change is 25.1%. The frequency of price changes varies substantially across product
sectors. There are about 44% of price adjustments are price decreases, which gives
evidence against the downward nominal rigidity hypothesis.
Second, the unconditional hazard function displays a downward sloping pattern with
annual spikes. The hazard rate is quite high at the rst month, which indicates that
a large proportion of rms reset their price in short period. After correcting for rms
heterogeneity and estimate a semiparametric duration model, the baseline hazard func-
tions still exhibit a downward slope with relatively large 12-month spike. The downward
sloping hazard can be explained by a time-varying Ss band model with persistent strong
idiosyncratic shock.
Third, the ination rate a¤ects the instantaneous probability of price change condi-
tional on that the price has been kept constant until that time period. Specically, a
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1% increase in the ination rate signicantly increase the hazard rate of price change by
about 7%. This result is consistent with the analysis of the pricing behaviour of rms
using qualitative surveys, and previous probabilistic and non-parametric studies.
Fourth, the factors that can a¤ect rms cost or demand will signicantly a¤ect the
hazard rate of price change, but in di¤erent magnitude. The change in interest rate will
have a large e¤ect on the hazard rate of price change. While the change in oil price,
industrial production, and exchange rate only have very small e¤ect on the probability
of changing prices.
Five, the unobservable heterogeneity is captured by using frailty model. Given the
signicance level of the likelihood-ratio test, we reject the null hypothesis that no such
heterogeneity present.
Finally, our estimation results of hazard ratio are quite robust under di¤erent speci-
cations of the empirical semiparametrical duration models.
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Figure 4-2: Aggregate baseline hazard function
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Figure 4-3: Sectoral baseline hazard function.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Main ndings
In Chapter 2 "Frequency, hazard function, and distribution across rms", I propose a
unied framework to assess the price rigidity. The frequency, hazard function, and the
distribution across rms are three di¤erent perspectives to look at the same thing. I
prove that these three methods can give the consistent estimates if we choose the proper
treatment on censoring price spells. I also compare the di¤erent assumption on the
right-censoring, and how robust our results are.
In CPI micro- data set, price changes are frequent (about 21% on average) and the
frequency of price changes varies a lot between di¤erent sectors. Excluding the sales from
CPI data, the frequency of price changes becomes much lower.
The aggregate hazard function is downward sloping with large annual spikes. The
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downward sloping aggregate hazard function can be seen as a result from the mixture of
heterogeneous price-setters.
I estimate the distribution across rms from the hazard function. Comparing with
the common used distribution of duration across contracts, I nd that the DAF (the
desired distribution) is much atter than the distribution across contracts. The single
sector Calvo distribution is far di¤erent from the actual DAF, suggesting that the Calvo
probability itself is not enough to generate the whole picture of price rigidity.
I solve and simulate two benchmark models, the basic Calvo model and menu costs
model. Both models can match the empirical ndings in frequency of prices changes and
the proportion of prices increases. However, these two benchmark models cannot meet
the empirical ndings in hazard functions . Moreover, the implied DAFs are di¤erent
from empirical one. Furthermore, I solve and simulate a multiple-sector Calvo model
and a multiple-sector menu costs model. The results suggest that adding heterogeneity
to price-setting model can improve its tness on micro evidence. As shown in Dixon and
Kara (2010), allowing for a distribution of durations can take us a long way to solving the
puzzle of ination persistence. In other words, an explicit modelling of the distribution
of durations can help the DSGE model to match macro data.
In Chapter 3 "What we can learn about the behaviour of rms from the average
monthly frequency of price-changes in CPI data: an application to the UK CPI micro
data", we nd that there is no simple way to map the frequency to the cross-sectional
distribution: to uncover this we need to make additional assumptions. However, we are
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able to say what the theoretical minimum cross-sectional mean duration is consistent
with an observed frequency: it is the mean duration of a price-spell which occurs when
all price-spells in the sector have the same or almost the same length. However, the
cross-sectional mean can be much longer.
When we look at the UK data using an estimated hazard function, we nd that the
UK data is long way from the distribution implied by the theoretical minimum. Looking
at di¤erent levels of disaggregation, we nd that whilst the minimum theoretical mean
duration is around 5.5-6.7 months, the actual data reveals a mean of almost 11 months.
We also nd that the more disaggregated the data, the closer are both the median and
mean to the true values. We also look at the aggregate data using the hypothesis that
the sectoral frequencies are generated by a Calvo distribution. The mean and median of
the hypothetical Calvo distribution can be close to the actual values. Above all, DSGE
models under the Calvo distribution hypothesis behave in a very similar way to models
calibrated with the microdata. This suggests that we can use the disaggregated frequency
data to calibrate DSGE models when we do not have reliable hazard function estimates
or access to the price microdata.
In Chapter 4 "The Ss pricing rule: an application to the UK PPI micro data", We
nd that producer prices are moderately sticky, and the unconditional hazard function
displays a downward sloping pattern with annual spikes. The hazard rate is quite high at
the rst month, which indicates that a large proportion of rms reset their price in short
period. After correcting for rms heterogeneity and estimate a semiparametric duration
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model, the baseline hazard functions still exhibit a downward slope with relatively large
12-month spike. The downward sloping hazard can be explained by a time-varying Ss
band model with persistent strong idiosyncratic shock.
The estimation result of the duration model suggests that the ination rate a¤ects
the instantaneous probability of price change conditional on that the price has been kept
constant until that time period. Specically, a 1% increase in the ination rate signif-
icantly increase the hazard rate of price change by about 7%. This result is consistent
with the analysis of the pricing behaviour of rms using qualitative surveys, and previ-
ous probabilistic and non-parametric studies. Moreover, the factors that can a¤ect rms
cost or demand will signicantly a¤ect the hazard rate of price change, but in di¤erent
magnitude. The change in interest rate will have a large e¤ect on the hazard rate of
price change. While the change in oil price, industrial production, and exchange rate
only have very small e¤ect on the probability of changing prices.
The last but not the least, the unobservable heterogeneity is captured by using frailty
model. Given the signicance level of the likelihood-ratio test, we reject the null hypoth-
esis that no such heterogeneity present.
5.2 Limitations of this research
No research can cover all aspects of the subject area it intends to investigate, and this
thesis is no exception to this rule.
Firstly, the micro data underlying the UK CPI and PPI are collected at monthly
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frequency. It is impossible to check whether the price has been changed more than once
within a month. This may lead to an overestimation of price rigidity for some goods, for
example, the fuel, fresh fruits, and etc. The weekly data or daily data would be preferred.
Secondly, this research only covers episodes of low ination in the UK. It is obscure
about the relationship between ination and consumer/producer price setting during
high ination episodes. A natural hypothese raised from this issue is how di¤erent the
price-setting behaviors exhibit in low- and high-ination economies.
Thirdly, this research only focuses on the price micro data. The wage micro dataset,
however, to our knowledge, is not public available. Furthermore, there is no easy mapping
between the wage micro data and price micro data. The lacking of wage micro data
prevents us to investigating the pass-through of unit labor cost on to price.
5.3 Future research
Threre are three directions in which the research as a whole could be further extended.
Firstly, more investigation could be carried out along similar research lines to this, but
involving wage micro data. As shown in Carlsson and Skans (2012), using detailed data on
product prices and unit labor cost merged at the rm level can help to evaluate competing
sets of assmptions regarding rms price-setting behviour. Secondly, a DSGE model with
di¤erent price-setting strategy can be test statistically. Especially, an indirect inference
test will be considered. Thirdly, the research can be extended to the policy issue such
as how monetary policy should respond to the aggregate shocks and/or sectoral shocks.
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Furthermore, the future research can be extended to investigate the consequences of
employing models that are inconsistent with the micro data for optimal monetary policy
design.
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